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Constitutional protection of economic rights: The Swiss and U.S. experience in comparison

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  • Peter Moser

Abstract

This paper analyzes the contribution of the Swiss and the U.S. Constitution to protect economic liberties, and compares the different strategies that both constitutions rely on to achieve this goal. Pertinent provisions in the Swiss Constitution are rather precise but relatively easy to change, whereas the U.S. Constitution is characterized by vaguely formulated constraints that are difficult to amend formally and that are interpreted by the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the substantial constitutional changes that did occur in both countries seem to have followed strikingly similar patterns: Initially, regional integration through reciprocal market opening within both countries facilitated the constitutional protection of economic liberties. Subsequently, the constitutional protection of economic liberties eroded in both countries, especially against federal legislation, due to changes in the interpretation of the constitution through the courts, or by formal amendment. Lastly, both constitutions were not immune against sudden demands by special interest groups that were being raised during times of crisis or war. Copyright George Mason University 1994

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Moser, 1994. "Constitutional protection of economic rights: The Swiss and U.S. experience in comparison," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 61-79, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:5:y:1994:i:1:p:61-79
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02393256
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    1. McGuire, Robert A & Ohsfeldt, Robert L, 1989. "Self-interest, Agency Theory, and Political Voting Behavior: The Ratification of the United States Constitution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 219-234, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tanzi, Vito & Schuknecht, Ludger, 1997. "Reforming government: An overview of recent experience," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 395-417, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    K11; K12; N40;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative

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