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Electoral Support and the Capture of Legislators: Evidence from North Carolina's Vote on Radioactive Waste Disposal

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  • Dennis Coates

Abstract

Empirical tests of Stigler's (1971) "theory of economic regulation" using roll-call voting of legislators have ignored Stigler's hypothesis that secure legislators behave differently from insecure legislators. In this study of legislator voting on the Southeast Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact in North Carolina, the extent to which legislators' votes "represent" the economic interests of their geographic constituencies is significantly influenced by the support they expect to receive in reelection campaigns. Moreover, there is weak evidence in favor of Stigler's supposition that more secure legislators are more likely to vote the general interest than are their less secure colleagues.

Suggested Citation

  • Dennis Coates, 1995. "Electoral Support and the Capture of Legislators: Evidence from North Carolina's Vote on Radioactive Waste Disposal," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(3), pages 502-518, Autumn.
    • Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:26:y:1995:i:autumn:p:502-518
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    Cited by:

    1. Dennis Coates, 2007. "Stadiums And Arenas: Economic Development Or Economic Redistribution?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 25(4), pages 565-577, October.
    2. Dennis Coates & Iuliia Naidenova & Petr Parshakov, 2019. "Determinants of governmental support of Russian companies: lessons on industrial policy, rent-seeking and corruption," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 438-466, December.

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