Political polarization, term length and too much delegation
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-018-9265-2
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Cited by:
- Reinsberg, Bernhard & Kern, Andreas & Rau-Göhring, Matthias, 2021. "The political economy of IMF conditionality and central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
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More about this item
Keywords
Delegation; Principal agency problem; Political polarization;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
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