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Are semi-presidential constitutions bad for democratic performance?

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  • José Cheibub
  • Svitlana Chernykh

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • José Cheibub & Svitlana Chernykh, 2009. "Are semi-presidential constitutions bad for democratic performance?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 202-229, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:20:y:2009:i:3:p:202-229
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-008-9072-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mershon, Carol, 1996. "The Costs of Coalition: Coalition Theories and Italian Governments," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(3), pages 534-554, September.
    2. Samuels, David, 2004. "Presidentialism and Accountability for the Economy in Comparative Perspective," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 425-436, August.
    3. Roberts, Kenneth M. & Wibbels, Erik, 1999. "Party Systems and Electoral Volatility in Latin America: A Test of Economic, Institutional, and Structural Explanations," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 93(3), pages 575-590, September.
    4. Amorim Neto, Octavio & Strøm, Kaare, 2006. "Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(4), pages 619-643, October.
    5. Oleh Protsyk, 2006. "Intra-Executive Competition between President and Prime Minister: Patterns of Institutional Conflict and Cooperation under Semi-Presidentialism," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 54, pages 219-244, June.
    6. Giovanni Sartori, 1994. "Comparative Constitutional Engineering," International Economic Association Series, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-349-22861-4.
    7. Haggard, Stephan & Webb, Steven B, 1993. "What Do We Know about the Political Economy of Economic Policy Reform?," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 8(2), pages 143-168, July.
    8. Brender, Adi & Drazen, Allan, 2005. "Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(7), pages 1271-1295, October.
    9. Diermeier, Daniel & Feddersen, Timothy J., 1998. "Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(3), pages 611-621, September.
    10. Huber, John D., 1996. "The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(2), pages 269-282, June.
    11. Oleh Protsyk, 2006. "Intra‐Executive Competition between President and Prime Minister: Patterns of Institutional Conflict and Cooperation under Semi‐Presidentialism," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 54(2), pages 219-244, June.
    12. Shugart,Matthew Soberg & Carey,John M., 1992. "Presidents and Assemblies," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521429900, October.
    13. Shugart,Matthew Soberg & Carey,John M., 1992. "Presidents and Assemblies," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521419628, October.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Democracy; Semi-presidentialism; Government instability; Economic reforms; Executive powers; Presidents; D02; H11;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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