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Intra‐Executive Competition between President and Prime Minister: Patterns of Institutional Conflict and Cooperation under Semi‐Presidentialism

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  • Oleh Protsyk

Abstract

The article examines the dynamics of political competition over the control of the executive that shapes the coexistence of popularly elected presidents and prime ministers in semi‐presidential regimes. It explores how variation in the political status of cabinet and the character of the party system, as well as differences in presidential and parliamentary powers over the cabinet, affects both the type and intensity of intra‐executive conflict in democratic and semi‐democratic environments. It demonstrates that presidents’ and prime ministers’ strategies in intra‐executive relations in both types of political environment are systematically affected by the nature and extent of cabinet’s political support in parliament, as well as by the degree of presidential control over cabinet.

Suggested Citation

  • Oleh Protsyk, 2006. "Intra‐Executive Competition between President and Prime Minister: Patterns of Institutional Conflict and Cooperation under Semi‐Presidentialism," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 54(2), pages 219-244, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:polstu:v:54:y:2006:i:2:p:219-244
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2006.00604.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Shugart, Matthew Soberg, 1995. "The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Presidential Government," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(2), pages 327-343, June.
    2. Shugart,Matthew Soberg & Carey,John M., 1992. "Presidents and Assemblies," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521429900, September.
    3. Shugart,Matthew Soberg & Carey,John M., 1992. "Presidents and Assemblies," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521419628, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. José Cheibub & Svitlana Chernykh, 2009. "Are semi-presidential constitutions bad for democratic performance?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 202-229, September.
    2. Martin Gross & Marc Debus, 2018. "Gaining new insights by going local: determinants of coalition formation in mixed democratic polities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 174(1), pages 61-80, January.
    3. Luís Aguiar-Conraria & Pedro C. Magalhães, 2008. "Growth, Centrism and Semi-Presidentialism: Forecasting the Portuguese General Elections," NIPE Working Papers 20/2008, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.

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