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Testing rational choice theories of institutional change

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  • Peter T. Leeson

    (George Mason University, USA)

  • Colin Harris

    (St. Olaf College, USA)

Abstract

Having empirically identified institutions as critical determinants of socioeconomic outcomes, social scientists are starting to turn their attention to empirically identifying sources of institutional change. Rational choice scholars offer two theories of such change: conflict theory and cooperation theory. We highlight crucial but easily overlooked methodological issues involved in attempting to evaluate these theories empirically. To do so, we critically examine Coleman and Mwangi’s study of property evolution among Maasai pastoralists in Kajiado, Kenya. Lessons from our examination, we hope, will help this burgeoning area of research proceed productively.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter T. Leeson & Colin Harris, 2018. "Testing rational choice theories of institutional change," Rationality and Society, , vol. 30(4), pages 420-431, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:30:y:2018:i:4:p:420-431
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463118803689
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    Cited by:

    1. Meina Cai & Ilia Murtazashvili & Jennifer Murtazashvili & Raufhon Salahodjaev, 2020. "Individualism and governance of the commons," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(1), pages 175-195, July.
    2. Peter T. Leeson & Colin Harris & Andrew Myers, 2021. "Kornai goes to Kenya," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 187(1), pages 99-110, April.
    3. Harris,Colin & Cai,Meina & Murtazashvili,Ilia & Murtazashvili,Jennifer Brick, 2020. "The Origins and Consequences of Property Rights," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108969055.
    4. Ricardo Nieva, 2021. "Heterogeneous coalitions and social revolutions," Rationality and Society, , vol. 33(2), pages 229-275, May.
    5. Boris Urban & Zethu Dlamini, 2020. "Intersections between policy and institutions: a focus on enterprise growth in Swaziland," Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 9(3), pages 253-275, April.

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