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Non-cooperative Mode, Cost-Sharing Mode, or Cooperative Mode: Which is the Optimal Mode for Desertification Control?

Author

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  • Jiayi Sun

    (Southwest Jiaotong University)

  • Deqing Tan

    (Southwest Jiaotong University)

Abstract

The problem of desertification is becoming increasingly severe, affecting the production and livelihood of people; this has led to keen interest in the issue, especially in developing countries. Based on the dynamic changes in desertification control scale and enterprise goodwill, we studied the game problem of desertification control between the government and enterprise under the non-cooperative, cost-sharing, and cooperative modes by constructing a differential game model. We put forward a revenue distribution mechanism with time consistency under the cooperation mode. The results show that government and enterprise control of desertification under the cooperative mode has the best effect, followed by the cost-sharing mode. The non-cooperative mode should be avoided. Lowering tax rates by the government is not always a good method of encouraging enterprises to increase desertification control investment. The tax rate should be adjusted according to the choice of governance mode as it can more effectively increase the investment level of enterprises in combating desertification. The optimal pricing of desert characteristic products is not affected by the governance mode.

Suggested Citation

  • Jiayi Sun & Deqing Tan, 2023. "Non-cooperative Mode, Cost-Sharing Mode, or Cooperative Mode: Which is the Optimal Mode for Desertification Control?," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 61(3), pages 975-1008, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:compec:v:61:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s10614-021-10128-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s10614-021-10128-3
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