Myopic vs. foresighted behaviors in a transboundary pollution game with abatement policy and emission permits trading
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2022.111807
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Y.H. Farzin & P.M. Kort, 2000.
"Pollution Abatement Investment When Environmental Regulation Is Uncertain,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 2(2), pages 183-212, April.
- Kort, P.M. & Farzin, Y.H., 2000. "Pollution abatement investment when environmental regulation is uncertain," Other publications TiSEM 90e78d8b-95d9-4d17-9d0f-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Benchekroun, Hassan & Martín-Herrán, Guiomar, 2016.
"The impact of foresight in a transboundary pollution game,"
European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 251(1), pages 300-309.
- Hassan BENCHEKROUN & Guiomar MARTÍN-HERRÁN, 2015. "The Impact of Foresight in a Transboundary Pollution Game," Cahiers de recherche 11-2015, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Chang, Shuhua & Qin, Weihua & Wang, Xinyu, 2018. "Dynamic optimal strategies in transboundary pollution game under learning by doing," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 490(C), pages 139-147.
- Tommy Lundgren, 2003. "A Real Options Approach to Abatement Investments and Green Goodwill," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 25(1), pages 17-31, May.
- Bengt Kristrom & Tommy Lundgren, 2003. "Abatement investments and green goodwill," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(18), pages 1915-1921.
- Shuhua Chang & Suresh P. Sethi & Xinyu Wang, 2018. "Optimal Abatement and Emission Permit Trading Policies in a Dynamic Transboundary Pollution Game," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 542-572, September.
- Li, Liming & Chen, Weidong, 2021. "The impact of subsidies in a transboundary pollution game with myopic players," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 103(C).
- Michèle Breton & Lucia Sbragia & Georges Zaccour, 2010.
"A Dynamic Model for International Environmental Agreements,"
Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 45(1), pages 25-48, January.
- Breton, Michele & Sbragia, Lucia & Zaccour, Georges, 2008. "Dynamic Models for International Environmental Agreements," Coalition Theory Network Working Papers 6231, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Michèle Breton & Lucia Sbragia & Georges Zaccour, 2008. "Dynamic Models for International Environmental Agreements," Working Papers 2008.33, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Shoude Li, 2014. "A Differential Game of Transboundary Industrial Pollution with Emission Permits Trading," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 163(2), pages 642-659, November.
- Shuhua Chang & Xinyu Wang & Alexander Shananin, 2015. "Modeling and Computation of Mean Field Equilibria in Producers' Game with Emission Permits Trading," Papers 1506.04869, arXiv.org.
- Dockner Engelbert J. & Van Long Ngo, 1993.
"International Pollution Control: Cooperative versus Noncooperative Strategies,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 13-29, July.
- Dockner, Engelbert J. & Van Long, Ngo, 1991. "International Pollution Control: Cooperative Versus Noncooperative Strategies," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 2, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
- Bertinelli, Luisito & Camacho, Carmen & Zou, Benteng, 2014.
"Carbon capture and storage and transboundary pollution: A differential game approach,"
European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 237(2), pages 721-728.
- Malika Hamadi & Guillermo Baquero, 2011. "Competition, Loan Rates and Information Dispersion in Microcredit Markets," DEM Discussion Paper Series 11-17, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Shuhua Chang & Suresh P. Sethi & Xinyu Wang, 2018. "Optimal Abatement and Emission Permit Trading Policies in a Dynamic Transboundary Pollution Game," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 542-572, September.
- Hao Xu & Deqing Tan, 2023. "Optimal Abatement Technology Licensing in a Dynamic Transboundary Pollution Game: Fixed Fee Versus Royalty," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 61(3), pages 905-935, March.
- Li, Liming & Chen, Weidong, 2021. "The impact of subsidies in a transboundary pollution game with myopic players," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 103(C).
- Li, Huiquan & Guo, Genlong, 2019. "A differential game analysis of multipollutant transboundary pollution in river basin," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 535(C).
- Hao Xu & Ming Luo, 2022. "Optimal Environmental Policy in a Dynamic Transboundary Pollution Game: Emission Standards, Taxes, and Permit Trading," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(15), pages 1-25, July.
- Javier Frutos & Víctor Gatón & Paula M. López-Pérez & Guiomar Martín-Herrán, 2022. "Investment in Cleaner Technologies in a Transboundary Pollution Dynamic Game: A Numerical Investigation," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 813-843, September.
- Baogui Xin & Wei Peng & Minghe Sun, 2019. "Optimal Coordination Strategy for International Production Planning and Pollution Abating under Cap-and-Trade Regulations," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 16(18), pages 1-21, September.
- Benchekroun, Hassan & Martín-Herrán, Guiomar, 2016.
"The impact of foresight in a transboundary pollution game,"
European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 251(1), pages 300-309.
- Hassan BENCHEKROUN & Guiomar MARTÍN-HERRÁN, 2015. "The Impact of Foresight in a Transboundary Pollution Game," Cahiers de recherche 11-2015, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Huijie Li & Deqing Tan, 2024. "How to Control Waste Incineration Pollution? Cost-Sharing or Penalty Mechanism—Based on Two Differential Game Models," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 21(2), pages 91-109, June.
- Li, Shoude & Zhang, Yingxuan, 2023. "Abatement technology innovation and pollution tax design: A dynamic analysis in monopoly," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(C).
- Fangju Jia & Dong‐dong Wang & Kun Zhou & Lianshui Li, 2022. "Differential decision analysis of transboundary pollution considering the participation of the central government," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(6), pages 1684-1703, September.
- Jiayi Sun & Deqing Tan, 2023. "Non-cooperative Mode, Cost-Sharing Mode, or Cooperative Mode: Which is the Optimal Mode for Desertification Control?," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 61(3), pages 975-1008, March.
- Fouad El Ouardighi & Konstantin Kogan & Giorgio Gnecco & Marcello Sanguineti, 2020. "Transboundary pollution control and environmental absorption efficiency management," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 287(2), pages 653-681, April.
- Xiao, Lu & Liu, Jianyue & Ge, Jinwen, 2021. "Dynamic game in agriculture and industry cross-sectoral water pollution governance in developing countries," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 243(C).
- Lu Xiao & Huacong Ding & Yu Zhong & Chaojie Wang, 2023. "Optimal Control of Industrial Pollution under Stochastic Differential Models," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(6), pages 1-16, March.
- Boucekkine, Raouf & Fabbri, Giorgio & Federico, Salvatore & Gozzi, Fausto, 2021.
"From firm to global-level pollution control: The case of transboundary pollution,"
European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 290(1), pages 331-345.
- Boucekkine, R. & Fabbri, G. & Federico, S. & Gozzi, F., 2020. "From firm to global-level pollution control: The case of transboundary pollution," Working Papers 2020-08, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
- Raouf Boucekkine & Giorgio Fabbri & Salvatore Federico & Fausto Gozzi, 2021. "From firm to global-level pollution control: the case of transboundary pollution," Post-Print hal-03467909, HAL.
- Raouf Boucekkine & Giorgio Fabbri & Salvatore Federico, 2020. "From Firm to Global-Level Pollution Control: the Case of Transboundary Pollution," Department of Economics University of Siena 818, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
- Raouf Boucekkine & Giorgio Fabbri & Salvatore Federico & Fausto Gozzi, 2021. "From firm to global-level pollution control: The case of transboundary pollution," Post-Print hal-02949275, HAL.
- André, Francisco J. & Sokri, Abderrahmane & Zaccour, Georges, 2011.
"Public Disclosure Programs vs. traditional approaches for environmental regulation: Green goodwill and the policies of the firm,"
European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 212(1), pages 199-212, July.
- Francisco J. André & Abderrahmane Sokri & Georges Zaccour, 2009. "Public Disclosure Programs vs. Traditional Approaches for Environmental Regulation: Green Goodwill and the Policies of the Firm," Working Papers 09.02, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
- Ouardighi, Fouad El & Sim, Jeong Eun & Kim, Bowon, 2016. "Pollution accumulation and abatement policy in a supply chain," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(3), pages 982-996.
- Yi, Yongxi & Xu, Rongwei & Zhang, Sheng, 2019. "A differential game of R&D investment for pollution abatement in different market structures," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 524(C), pages 587-600.
- Brannlund, Runar & Lundgren, Tommy, 2007. "Swedish industry and Kyoto--An assessment of the effects of the European CO2 emission trading system," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(9), pages 4749-4762, September.
More about this item
Keywords
Transboundary pollution game; Foresight; Myopic; Emission permits trading; Abatement policy;All these keywords.
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:156:y:2022:i:c:s0960077922000182. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thayer, Thomas R. (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.elsevier.com/chaos-solitons-and-fractals .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.