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Candidate Ambition and Advancement under Term Limits

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  • Natalya Brown

Abstract

In this paper, I present a model of candidate entry into a two-tiered hierarchy of political positions with the objective of exploring the extent to which term limits at lower level political positions alter the average skill of office-seekers for higher level political positions. In addition, this paper analyzes whether the increase in political skill in upper level office holders comes at the expense of lower level political positions. The results suggest that under certain conditions term limits on lower level elected offices may reduce the expected political skill of officeholders at the lower level without guaranteeing an increase in skill at the upper level. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Natalya Brown, 2014. "Candidate Ambition and Advancement under Term Limits," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 42(1), pages 53-64, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:42:y:2014:i:1:p:53-64
    DOI: 10.1007/s11293-013-9397-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mattozzi, Andrea & Merlo, Antonio, 2008. "Political careers or career politicians?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 597-608, April.
    2. Joseph E. Harrington Jr., 2000. "Progressive ambition, electoral selection, and the creation of ideologues," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 13-23, March.
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    5. Messner, Matthias & Polborn, Mattias K., 2004. "Paying politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2423-2445, December.
      • Matthias Messner & Mattias Polborn, 2003. "Paying Politicians," Working Papers 246, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    6. Reed, W Robert & Schansberg, D Eric, 1994. "An Analysis of the Impact of Congressional Term Limits," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 32(1), pages 79-91, January.
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    9. Michael P. Keane & Antonio Merlo, 2010. "Money, Political Ambition, and the Career Decisions of Politicians," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 186-215, August.
    10. Franklin, Daniel & Westin, Tor, 1998. "Predicting the Institutional Effects of Term Limits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 96(3-4), pages 381-393, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Politicians; Political ambition; Term limits; D72;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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