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Predicting the Institutional Effects of Term Limits

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  • Franklin, Daniel
  • Westin, Tor

Abstract

In this paper, the authors develop a model to predict the seniority turnover, and transition consequences of term limit reforms for any institution with a regularized procedure for rotating membership. With this model they can predict the number of members who will be serving in their last term at any given time once an institution reaches a stable state under term limit reforms. For example, the authors results show that for the U.S. Senate current term limit proposals will result in a substantial increase in the number of 'lame duck' members and a significant reduction in average seniority. They make no claims as to the public policy effects of term limit proposals. However, their model can be used to design a proposal that will maximize any benefits or minimize any public policy effects found to be associated with term limit reforms. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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  • Franklin, Daniel & Westin, Tor, 1998. "Predicting the Institutional Effects of Term Limits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 96(3-4), pages 381-393, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:96:y:1998:i:3-4:p:381-93
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    Cited by:

    1. Natalya Brown, 2014. "Candidate Ambition and Advancement under Term Limits," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 42(1), pages 53-64, March.
    2. Smart, Michael & Sturm, Daniel M., 2013. "Term limits and electoral accountability," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 93-102.
    3. Eiji Yamamura, 2016. "Governors’ term of office and information disclosure: Evidence from Japan," Journal of Economics and Econometrics, Economics and Econometrics Society, vol. 59(1), pages 48-78.
    4. Mark Schelker, 2009. "Auditor Terms and Term Limits in the Public Sector: Evidence from the US States," CREMA Working Paper Series 2009-19, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    5. Mark Schelker, 2012. "The influence of auditor term length and term limits on US state general obligation bond ratings," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 27-49, January.

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