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Probability of no default for a microloan under uncertainty

Author

Listed:
  • Perpetual Andam Boiquaye

    (University of Ghana)

  • Philip Protter

    (Columbia University)

Abstract

Microloans are important to the underprivileged. It helps those in need make ends meet and maintain daily activities. While not yet a life-changing tool, it can significantly impact women’s empowerment in rural areas worldwide. This is a cost-effective method of assisting those in need. The unpredictable behavior of both borrowers and lenders is a major worry in microlending. Especially in terms of borrowers repaying their debts with interest and lenders remaining economically feasible. To accomplish this, we develop a model that explains the wealth dynamics of women selling inexpensive goods from baskets on their heads while incorporating uncertainty. We use a mathematical approach to estimate the probability of no default. We demonstrate that the lender should charge an interest rate based on the lending cost while taking into account the drift and the business’s uncertainties. This will allow them to repay their loan with interest without defaulting, as well as make lending more sustainable.

Suggested Citation

  • Perpetual Andam Boiquaye & Philip Protter, 2024. "Probability of no default for a microloan under uncertainty," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 521-528, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:annfin:v:20:y:2024:i:4:d:10.1007_s10436-024-00455-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s10436-024-00455-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ghatak, Maitreesh & Guinnane, Timothy W., 1999. "The economics of lending with joint liability: theory and practice," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 195-228, October.
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    4. Jonathan Morduch, 1999. "The Microfinance Promise," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1569-1614, December.
    5. Philip Protter & Alejandra Quintos, 2022. "Optimal group size in microlending," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 121-132, March.
    6. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1990. "Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 4(3), pages 351-366, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Microfinance; Microloan; Probability of no default; Interest rate;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
    • C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - General
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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