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Optimal group size in microlending

Author

Listed:
  • Philip Protter

    (Columbia University)

  • Alejandra Quintos

    (Columbia University)

Abstract

Microlending, where a bank lends to a small group of people without credit histories, began with the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, and is widely seen as the creation of Muhammad Yunus, who received the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of his largely successful efforts. Since that time the modeling of microlending has received a fair amount of academic attention. One of the issues not yet addressed in full detail, however, is the issue of the size of the group. Some attention has nevertheless been paid using an experimental and game theory approach. We, instead, take a mathematical approach to the issue of an optimal group size, where the goal is to minimize the probability of default of the group. To do this, one has to create a model with interacting forces, and to make precise the hypotheses of the model. We show that the original choice of Muhammad Yunus, of a group size of five people, is, under the right, and, we believe, reasonable hypotheses, either close to optimal, or even at times exactly optimal, i.e., the optimal group size is indeed five people.

Suggested Citation

  • Philip Protter & Alejandra Quintos, 2022. "Optimal group size in microlending," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 121-132, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:annfin:v:18:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1007_s10436-020-00382-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s10436-020-00382-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Cao, Bin & Zhong, Yuanguang & Zhou, Yong-Wu, 2024. "The role of completely joint liability in financing multiple capital-constrained firms: Risk sharing, inventory and financial strategies," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 313(3), pages 1072-1087.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Microcredit; Microlending; Group lending; Group size;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
    • C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - General
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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