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Why Constitutional Protection of Property Becomes Less Certain Over Time

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  • Alan Lockard

    (George Mason University)

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  • Alan Lockard, 2002. "Why Constitutional Protection of Property Becomes Less Certain Over Time," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 17(Spring 20), pages 37-50.
    • Handle: RePEc:jpe:journl:62
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Miceli, Thomas J & Segerson, Kathleen, 1994. "Regulatory Takings: When Should Compensation Be Paid?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 749-776, June.
    2. Miceli, Thomas J. & Cosgel, Metin M., 1994. "Reputation and judicial decision-making," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 31-51, January.
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