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Property rights and land use regulation: a comparative evaluation

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  • Bonti-Ankomah, Samuel
  • Fox, Glenn

Abstract

This paper reviews the rationale for policies aimed at limiting the conversion of farmland to nonfarm uses from the perspective of the economic theory of property rights. Policy measures to restrict the conversion of agricultural land to non-farm uses are commonplace in many countries. Typically, these policies are introduced to address long-run food security issues and possible externalities associated with incompatibility in land uses. The paper argues that the presence of externalities in the land market does not warrant farmland protection policies. Farmland protection policies in themselves can be a source of policy failure. It concludes that well-defined property rights along with nuisance and trespass laws, are necessary and sufficient for efficient allocation of land and can be a better alternative to farmland protection policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Bonti-Ankomah, Samuel & Fox, Glenn, 2000. "Property rights and land use regulation: a comparative evaluation," Agrekon, Agricultural Economics Association of South Africa (AEASA), vol. 39(3), pages 1-25, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:agreko:54237
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.54237
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Weitzman, Martin L., 1974. "Free access vs private ownership as alternative systems for managing common property," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 225-234, June.
    2. Glenn Fox, 1994. "The Structure of Ownership and Prosperity," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 42(4), pages 511-524, December.
    3. Miceli, Thomas J & Segerson, Kathleen, 1994. "Regulatory Takings: When Should Compensation Be Paid?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 749-776, June.
    4. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    5. Bromley, Daniel W., 1991. "Testing for common versus private property: Comment," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 92-96, July.
    6. Daniel Bromley, 1992. "The commons, common property, and environmental policy," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(1), pages 1-17, January.
    7. J. H. Dales, 1968. "Land, Water, and Ownership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 1(4), pages 791-804, November.
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    Keywords

    Land Economics/Use;

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