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Alternatives to Paying Efficiency Wages: Why No PEOPLEFAX?

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  • Robert Tucker Omberg

    (George Mason University)

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Robert Tucker Omberg, 2020. "Alternatives to Paying Efficiency Wages: Why No PEOPLEFAX?," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 35(Summer 20), pages 77-88.
  • Handle: RePEc:jpe:journl:1685
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Raff, Daniel M G & Summers, Lawrence H, 1987. "Did Henry Ford Pay Efficiency Wages?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 5(4), pages 57-86, October.
    2. Gary S. Becker & William M. Landes, 1974. "Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number beck74-1.
    3. Segalla, Michael & Jacobs-Belschak, Gabriele & Müller, Christiane, 2001. "Cultural influences on employee termination decisions:: Firing the good, average or the old?," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 58-72, February.
    4. Rosenband, Leonard N., 1985. "Productivity and Labor Discipline in the Montgolfier Paper Mill, 1780–1805," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(2), pages 435-443, June.
    5. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
    6. Horn,Jeff, 2015. "Economic Development in Early Modern France," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107046283, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    efficiency wages; labor economics; history of management;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J00 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - General
    • J53 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Labor-Management Relations; Industrial Jurisprudence
    • N00 - Economic History - - General - - - General

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