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Managerial Ownership, Board Structure And Firm’S Performance: A Review Of Main Findings

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  • Cristina Boþa-Avram

    (Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania)

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to provide a comprehensive review of the main studies that have investigated the connections between managerial ownership, board aracteristics and firm’s performance. It discusses the methodological approaches used in researching the ownership’s structure – performance relationship, highlighting the main findings and finally proposing directions for further research.

Suggested Citation

  • Cristina Boþa-Avram, 2012. "Managerial Ownership, Board Structure And Firm’S Performance: A Review Of Main Findings," CES Working Papers, Centre for European Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, vol. 4(4), pages 648-656, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:jes:wpaper:y:2012:v:4:i:4:p:648-656
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Christian Bayer & Carsten Burhop, 2009. "If only I could sack you! Management turnover and performance in Great German Banks between 1874 and 1913," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(2), pages 141-145.
    2. Himmelberg, Charles P. & Hubbard, R. Glenn & Palia, Darius, 1999. "Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 353-384, September.
    3. Emma L. Schultz & David T. Tan & Kathleen D. Walsh, 2010. "Endogeneity and the corporate governance - performance relation," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 35(2), pages 145-163, August.
    4. Julio Pindado & Chabela De La Torre, 2004. "Why is ownership endogenous?," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(14), pages 901-904.
    5. Nelson, Charles R & Startz, Richard, 1990. "The Distribution of the Instrumental Variables Estimator and Its t-Ratio When the Instrument Is a Poor One," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(1), pages 125-140, January.
    6. Saibal Ghosh, 2006. "Do board characteristics affect corporate performance? Firm-level evidence for India," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(7), pages 435-443.
    7. Pornsit Jiraporn & Wallace Davidson, 2009. "Regulation, shareholder rights and corporate governance: an empirical note," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(10), pages 977-982.
    8. Klaus Gugler & Jurgen Weigand, 2003. "Is ownership really endogenous?," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(8), pages 483-486.
    9. Stephen Ferris & Murali Jagannathan, 2001. "The incidence and determinants of multiple corporate directorships," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(1), pages 31-35.
    10. Miguel Manjon, 2007. "Does the proxy for shareholders' control make a difference in firm-performance regressions? Evidence from a blockholder system of corporate governance," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(6), pages 445-449.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    managerial ownership; board structure; firm’s performance; endogeneity; corporate governance Romania;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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