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The incidence and determinants of multiple corporate directorships

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  • Stephen Ferris
  • Murali Jagannathan

Abstract

Contrary to the concerns of the Council of Institutional Investors and other shareholder activists, it is reported that the incidence of multiple board memberships appointments by corporate directors is low, with only 4% of the sample holding three or more seats. It is found that directors in regulated industries hold fewer board memberships than those in unregulated businesses. Firm size, board size, firm performance and corporate growth opportunities positively influence the number of directorships held by individual directors. It is further discovered that increased equity ownership of the firm by the board is associated with fewer external appointments by the board members. It is concluded that proposals to limit the number of directorships held by an individual may be ill-advised.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen Ferris & Murali Jagannathan, 2001. "The incidence and determinants of multiple corporate directorships," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(1), pages 31-35.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:8:y:2001:i:1:p:31-35
    DOI: 10.1080/135048501750041259
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    Cited by:

    1. Le, Quyen & Vafaei, Alireza & Ahmed, Kamran & Kutubi, Shawgat, 2022. "Independent directors' reputation incentives and firm performance – an Australian perspective," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    2. Pombo, Carlos & Gutiérrez, Luis H., 2011. "Outside directors, board interlocks and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Colombian business groups," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 63(4), pages 251-277, July.
    3. repec:jes:wpaper:y:2012:v:4:p:648-656 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. G. Tyge Payne & George S. Benson & David L. Finegold, 2009. "Corporate Board Attributes, Team Effectiveness and Financial Performance," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(4), pages 704-731, June.
    5. Cristina Boþa-Avram, 2012. "Managerial Ownership, Board Structure And Firm’S Performance: A Review Of Main Findings," CES Working Papers, Centre for European Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, vol. 4(4), pages 648-656, December.

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