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Empirical Evidence Of The Influences On First-Price Bid Auction Premiums

Author

Listed:
  • Abdul - Rasheed Amidu

    (Birmingham City University)

  • Alirat Olayinka Agboola

    (Obafemi Awolowo University)

Abstract

This study examines the determinants of auction premium using data from a first-price sealed bid auction of Federal Government Landed Properties in Nigeria. The results indicate that the number of bidders and location are important determinants of auction price premiums. These findings are consistent with the auction theory. The empirical estimates also suggest that property type as well as bidder characteristics may also influence auction premiums.

Suggested Citation

  • Abdul - Rasheed Amidu & Alirat Olayinka Agboola, 2009. "Empirical Evidence Of The Influences On First-Price Bid Auction Premiums," International Real Estate Review, Global Social Science Institute, vol. 12(2), pages 157-170.
  • Handle: RePEc:ire:issued:v:12:n:02:2009:p:157-170
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jin-Ray Lu & Chih-Chiang Huang, 2015. "Identifying Stock Market Reactions to Acquisition Announcements in Taiwan Land Auction," Asian Economic and Financial Review, Asian Economic and Social Society, vol. 5(8), pages 1014-1028, August.
    2. Drake, Samielle & Xu, Fei, 2023. "Regulation and Competition in Public Procurement," Umeå Economic Studies 1013, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    3. Rosane Hungria-Gunnelin, 2013. "Impact of Number of Bidders on Sale Price of Auctioned Condominium Apartments in Stockholm," International Real Estate Review, Global Social Science Institute, vol. 16(3), pages 274-295.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Real estate markets; First-price bid auction; Auction price premium; Nigeria;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L85 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Real Estate Services

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