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Sex, Lies, and the Hillblom Estate: A Decision Analysis

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  • Steven A. Lippman

    (Anderson Graduate School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles, 110 Westwood Plaza, Box 951481, Los Angeles, California 90095-1481)

  • Kevin F. McCardle

    (Anderson Graduate School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles, 110 Westwood Plaza, Box 951481, Los Angeles, California 90095-1481)

Abstract

We present three approaches to evaluating a publicly detailed, high-stakes, high-risk decision made by an heir-claimant to the estate of Larry Hillblom. The first two approaches are standard: a decision tree focusing on risk aversion and a multiperiod consumption model that highlights the effects of forgone consumption. In the third approach, we embed several Nash bargaining games into the decision tree developed in the first approach.

Suggested Citation

  • Steven A. Lippman & Kevin F. McCardle, 2004. "Sex, Lies, and the Hillblom Estate: A Decision Analysis," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 1(3), pages 149-166, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ordeca:v:1:y:2004:i:3:p:149-166
    DOI: 10.1287/deca.1040.0025
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lippman, Steven A. & McCardle, Kevin F. & Tang, Christopher S., 2013. "Using Nash bargaining to design project management contracts under cost uncertainty," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 199-207.

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