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The Simple Case For Collective Action Clauses

Author

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  • Jorge Fernández-Ruiz

    (El Colegio de México, A. C.)

Abstract

En este trabajo se presenta un modelo que ilustra en forma sencilla los beneficios de incluir Cláusulas de Acción Colectiva en los contratos de deuda soberana. Primero mostramos que puede presentarse una situación en que, a pesar de que un perdón parcial de deuda produzca mejoras en el sentido de Pareto, este alivio no se produzca debido a la existencia de múltiples acreedores. Posteriormente mostramos que la inclusión de Cláusulas de Acción Colectiva permite que la reducción de deuda socialmente beneficiosa se produzca.

Suggested Citation

  • Jorge Fernández-Ruiz, 2004. "The Simple Case For Collective Action Clauses," Remef - Revista Mexicana de Economía y Finanzas Nueva Época REMEF (The Mexican Journal of Economics and Finance), Instituto Mexicano de Ejecutivos de Finanzas, IMEF, vol. 3(3), pages 237-248, Septiembr.
    • Handle: RePEc:imx:journl:v:3:y:2004:i:3:p:237-248
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Creditor co-ordination; Collective Action Clauses; Sovereign debt;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F30 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - General
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems

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