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Generalists, Specialists: Who Gets to the Top

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  • Xuefei Sophie Wang

Abstract

This paper tries to analyze the three aspects of hierarchy: (1) generalists or specialists: which should get to the top? (2) How many agents should get to the top? (3) Can the agents who should be at the top in the optimal hierarchy really get to the top? Using a T-period model with promotion, the paper finds that the optimal hierarchy form depends on the size of the externality of coordinating multiple assets by generalists. How many agents should be at the top depends on the elasticity of the externality of coordinating multiple assets. Finally, promotion opportunity gives agents who should at the top more incentive to exert effort, and thus are more likely to get promoted.

Suggested Citation

  • Xuefei Sophie Wang, 2008. "Generalists, Specialists: Who Gets to the Top," International Journal of Management and Marketing Research, The Institute for Business and Finance Research, vol. 1(1), pages 99-110.
    • Handle: RePEc:ibf:ijmmre:v:1:y:2008:i:1:p:99-110
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
    2. repec:ner:ucllon:http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/17678/ is not listed on IDEAS
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    hierarchy; incentive; promotion; promotion opportunities; generalists; specialists;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
    • M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions

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