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Screening- und Kompensationsfunktion alternativer Beschäftigungsformen für Schwerbehinderte (Screening and compensation function of alternative forms of employment for the severely disabled)

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  • Winkler, Albrecht

Abstract

"In view of the above-average extent to which the severely disabled are affected by unemployment, with a high proportion of long-term unemployed, there are in principle two options for a selective labour market policy aimed at reducing discrimination on the labour market. Firstly an attempt can be made to improve the labour market prospects of particularly disadvantaged groups of people by increasing the efficiency of employment and training measures and raising target group orientation. Starting out from the assumption that the poor chances of reintegration of severely disabled people are caused by supposed disadvantages in productivity, both labour market intermediaries (job placement) and intermediate labour markets (alternative forms of employment between unemployment and a normal employment relationship) are studied with regard to the extent to which they can give companies indications of the capability of job applicants and in this way increase the reintegration prospects of problem groups on the labour market. This possibility of screening is provided in particular by the instrument of placement-orientated temporary work via employment agencies. Secondly there is the possibility of making available more subsidised jobs for this group of people in a complementary labour market in order to compensate for the unequal employment prospects and to establish new forms of employment which are suitable for the target group - over and above sheltered workshops." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

Suggested Citation

  • Winkler, Albrecht, 1997. "Screening- und Kompensationsfunktion alternativer Beschäftigungsformen für Schwerbehinderte (Screening and compensation function of alternative forms of employment for the severely disabled)," Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 30(2), pages 432-441.
    • Handle: RePEc:iab:iabmit:v:30:i:2:p:432-441
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Albert Ma, Ching-to & Weiss, Andrew M., 1993. "A signaling theory of unemployment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 135-157, January.
    2. Gary Burtless, 1985. "Are Targeted Wage Subsidies Harmful? Evidence from a Wage Voucher Experiment," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 39(1), pages 105-114, October.
    3. Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
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