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Exploring the Motivation behind Leakage of Internal Audit Reports (Whistle Blowing) in the Public Sector in Kenya

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Listed:
  • Charles Guandaru Kamau
  • Samuel Nduati Kariuki
  • David Nandasaba Musuya

Abstract

The objective of this study was to explore the various motivators behind leakage of internal audit reports in public sector in Kenya. Leakage of information was considered as a mild act of whistleblowing. This study made use of primary data obtained from 23 internal auditors randomly selected from the public sector. The relevant data was analyzed using descriptive statistics and also subjected to Pearson coefficient of correlation and multiple linear regression analysis techniques. The results obtained by the study indicate that there was a significant influence of staff dissatisfaction, compensation, reporting structures, policy framework, public protection and personal conviction on information leakage in the public sector in Kenya. However, reputation, management commitment and accountability enforcement were found to be insignificant motivators behind information leakage.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles Guandaru Kamau & Samuel Nduati Kariuki & David Nandasaba Musuya, 2017. "Exploring the Motivation behind Leakage of Internal Audit Reports (Whistle Blowing) in the Public Sector in Kenya," International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, Human Resource Management Academic Research Society, International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, vol. 7(3), pages 48-57, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:hur:ijaraf:v:7:y:2017:i:3:p:48-57
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Claus Thustrup Kreiner & Emmanuel Saez, 2016. "Why Can Modern Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 83(330), pages 219-246, April.
    2. Jingyu Gao & Robert Greenberg & Bernard Wong-On-Wing, 2015. "Whistleblowing Intentions of Lower-Level Employees: The Effect of Reporting Channel, Bystanders, and Wrongdoer Power Status," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 85-99, January.
    3. Yahel Ma’ayan & Abraham Carmeli, 2016. "Internal Audits as a Source of Ethical Behavior, Efficiency, and Effectiveness in Work Units," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 137(2), pages 347-363, August.
    4. Imen Khelil & Khaled Hussainey & Hedi Noubbigh, 2016. "Audit committee – internal audit interaction and moral courage," Managerial Auditing Journal, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 31(4/5), pages 403-433, April.
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