IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/hpe/journl/y2021v236i1p65-104.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Provision of Public Services under Conditions of Financial Stress: Evidence from Spanish Autonomous Communities

Author

Listed:
  • Antoni Zabalza

    (University of Valencia)

Abstract

The 2008 economic crisis had three consequences for Spanish regional governments: first, there was a substantial and sudden fall of their revenue, which they had no effective means to redress, while citizens demands for education, health and other services continued to increase as usual; second, their debt, which until then had been relatively small and stable, exploded to unknown levels; and third, there was a serious deterioration of the extent and quality of the set of public services provided by these governments. The first two consequences show up quite clearly in official statistics, while the third, on which arguably there is a high level of consensus among citizens, has not been systematically and formally documented. This article develops a simple model of public expenditure that explains these facts. It suggests that, under conditions of financial stress, it may be rational for regional governments to spend more than the resources they have, and thus to incur in debt finance, and at the same time to accept a deterioration of the extent and quality of the services provided to the public. More concretely, the model predicts that, if a meaningful measure of the gap between expenditure needs and revenue can be identified, then the optimal behaviour of governments is to absorb a part of this gap by borrowing and the rest by letting service provision to deteriorate. In a situation of financial stress, along with the traditional influence of revenue, demography plays a role of its own in the determination of governments’ behaviour. We test these hypotheses with a panel of data on expenditure, revenue and a series of indicators of expenditure need (essentially demographic indicators) of the fifteen “common regime” Spanish autonomous communities over the period that goes from 2007 to 2017. None of the predictions of the model is rejected by the data.

Suggested Citation

  • Antoni Zabalza, 2021. "The Provision of Public Services under Conditions of Financial Stress: Evidence from Spanish Autonomous Communities," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 236(1), pages 65-104, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:hpe:journl:y:2021:v:236:i:1:p:65-104
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hpe-rpe.org/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?juwpfisadmin=false&action=wpfd&task=file.download&wpfd_category_id=207&wpfd_file_id=4744&token=781c9cee6080ca63e82ed1a5149c2803&preview=1
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hansen, Lars Peter, 1982. "Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments Estimators," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 1029-1054, July.
    2. Henning Bohn, 1998. "The Behavior of U. S. Public Debt and Deficits," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(3), pages 949-963.
    3. Foremny, Dirk, 2014. "Sub-national deficits in European countries: The impact of fiscal rules and tax autonomy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 86-110.
    4. Julio López Laborda & Antonio Zabalza, 2011. "Mantenimiento temporal de la equidad horizontal en el sistema de financiación autonómica," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 197(2), pages 37-65, June.
    5. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, November.
    6. Barro, Robert J, 1979. "On the Determination of the Public Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 940-971, October.
    7. Roberts, Kevin W. S., 1977. "Voting over income tax schedules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 329-340, December.
    8. Jonathan A. Rodden & Gunnar S. Eskeland (ed.), 2003. "Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262182297, December.
    9. Francisco Bastida & Bernardino Benito, 2010. "Politics and financial management: a long-term evaluation on Spanish local governments," International Journal of Critical Accounting, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 2(3), pages 249-266.
    10. Borge, Lars-Erik, 2005. "Strong politicians, small deficits: evidence from Norwegian local governments," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 325-344, June.
    11. Jordi Galí & Roberto Perotti, 2003. "Fiscal policy and monetary integration in Europe [‘Consumption smoothing through fiscal policy in OECD and EU countries’]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 18(37), pages 533-572.
    12. Laura Fernández-Caballero & Diego J. Pedregal & Javier J. Pérez, 2012. "Monitoring Sub-central Government Spending in Spain," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 202(3), pages 77-104, September.
    13. Galí, Jordi & Perotti, Roberto, 2003. "Fiscal Policy and Monetary Integration in Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 3933, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Antoni Zabalza & Julio López-Laborda, 2011. "The new Spanish system of intergovernmental transfers," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 18(6), pages 750-786, December.
    15. Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-927, October.
    16. Bosch, Nuria & Suarez-Pandiello, Javier, 1995. "Seven Hypotheses about Public Choice and Local Spending (A Test from Spanish Municipalities)," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 50(1), pages 36-50.
    17. Lago Peñas, Santiago & Fernández Leiceaga, Xoaquín & Vaquero, Alberto, 2017. "¿Por qué incumplen fiscalmente las Comunidades Autónomas?," INVESTIGACIONES REGIONALES - Journal of REGIONAL RESEARCH, Asociación Española de Ciencia Regional, issue 37, pages 7-29.
    18. Rudiger Ahrend & Marta Curto-Grau & Camila Vammalle, 2013. "Passing the Buck? Central and Sub-national Governments in Times of Fiscal Stress," OECD Regional Development Working Papers 2013/5, OECD Publishing.
    19. Manuel Arellano & Stephen Bond, 1991. "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 58(2), pages 277-297.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Alberto Vaquero-García & María Cadaval-Sampedro & Santiago Lago-Peñas, 2022. "Do Political Factors Affect Fiscal Consolidation? Evidence From Spanish Regional Governments," SAGE Open, , vol. 12(1), pages 21582440221, March.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Golinelli, Roberto & Momigliano, Sandro, 2006. "Real-time determinants of fiscal policies in the euro area," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 28(9), pages 943-964, December.
    2. Sven Jari Stehn & Ms. Annalisa Fedelino, 2009. "Fiscal Incentive Effects of the German Equalization System," IMF Working Papers 2009/124, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Siniša Mali & Lenka MaliCká, 2023. "Impact of Fiscal Decentralization on Fiscal Stance in EU: Real Deal or Econometric Illusion?," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 246(3), pages 71-99, September.
    4. Sacchi, Agnese & Salotti, Simone, 2015. "The impact of national fiscal rules on the stabilisation function of fiscal policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 1-20.
    5. Roberto Golinelli & Sandro Momigliano, 2006. "Real-time determinants of fiscal policies in the euro area: Fiscal rules, cyclical conditions and elections," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 609, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    6. Serhan Cevik & Katerina Teksoz, 2014. "Deep Roots of Fiscal Behavior," Journal of Banking and Financial Economics, University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management, vol. 2(2), pages 5-33, November.
    7. Valentino Larcinese, 2007. "Voting over Redistribution and the Size of the Welfare State: The Role of Turnout," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 55(3), pages 568-585, October.
    8. Larch, Martin & Orseau, Eloïse & van der Wielen, Wouter, 2021. "Do EU fiscal rules support or hinder counter-cyclical fiscal policy?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    9. Santiago Lago-Peñas & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Agnese Sacchi, 2020. "Fiscal stability during the Great Recession: putting decentralization design to the test," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 54(7), pages 919-930, July.
    10. Serhan Cevik & Vibha Nanda, 2020. "Riding the storm: fiscal sustainability in the Caribbean," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 34(3), pages 384-399, May.
    11. Michał Mackiewicz & Piotr Krajewski, 2009. "On the mechanisms of achieving fiscal (un)sustainability: the case of Poland," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 36(4), pages 445-460, November.
    12. Ananya Kotia & Victor Duarte Lledo, 2016. "Do Subnational Fiscal Rules Foster Fiscal Discipline? New Empirical Evidence from Europe," IMF Working Papers 2016/084, International Monetary Fund.
    13. Pierre Aldama & Jérôme Creel, 2020. "Asymmetric macroeconomic stabilization and fiscal consolidation in the OECD and the Euro Area," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2020-09, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
    14. Dragan Tevdovski & Petar Jolakoski & Viktor Stojkoski, 2021. "Determinants of budget deficits: Focus on the effects from the COVID-19 crisis," Papers 2105.14959, arXiv.org.
    15. Oya Celasun & Xavier Debrun & Jonathan D. Ostry, 2006. "Primary Surplus Behavior and Risks to Fiscal Sustainability in Emerging Market Countries: A "Fan-Chart" Approach," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 53(3), pages 1-3.
    16. Checherita-Westphal, Cristina & Žďárek, Václav, 2017. "Fiscal reaction function and fiscal fatigue: evidence for the euro area," Working Paper Series 2036, European Central Bank.
    17. Roberto Golinelli & Sandro Momigliano, 2009. "The Cyclical Reaction of Fiscal Policies in the Euro Area: The Role of Modelling Choices and Data Vintages," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 30(1), pages 39-72, March.
    18. Ethan Ilzetzki & Carlos A. Vegh, 2008. "Procyclical Fiscal Policy in Developing Countries: Truth or Fiction?," NBER Working Papers 14191, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Dragan Tevdovski & Petar Jolakoski & Viktor Stojkoski, 2022. "Determinants Of Budget Deficits: The Effects Of The Covid-19 Crisis," Economic Annals, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Belgrade, vol. 67(232), pages 105-126, January –.
    20. Joan Maria Mussons Olivella, 2020. "Fiscal Responsiveness to Public Debt: An Analysis of Regional Debt Limit Uncertainty in Spain," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 233(2), pages 55-83, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Demography; Expenditure needs; Public expenditure; Public revenue; Deficit; Debt; Regional governments; Financial stress;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H12 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Crisis Management
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
    • H74 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Borrowing
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hpe:journl:y:2021:v:236:i:1:p:65-104. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Miguel Gómez de Antonio (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iefgves.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.