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Economía y política en la duración de los Gobiernos: El caso de España (1977-2001)

Author

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  • Jose Luis Sáez Lozano

    (Universidad de Granada)

Abstract

Desde que en 1896 Lowell publicara un estudio que revisaba la relación entre el poder ejecutivo y los partidos en Europa, han ido apareciendo múltiples trabajos que analizan la permanencia de los gobiernos en el poder. Fue en la década de los noventa, cuando los investigadores comenzaron a utilizar los modelos de duración, con el fin de identificar los factores que determinan la supervivencia de los gabinetes. En este artículo planteamos un esquema flexible para analizar la duración de los gobiernos democráticos, que consta de una función no paramétrica y un análisis paramétrico de forma condicional. Además, incorporamos dos variables macroeconómicas (las tasas de variación subyacente de la inflación y el desempleo), además del superávit/déficit de popularidad, como factores explicativos que condicionan la longevidad de los ejecutivos. Uno de los retos que nos planteamos en este estudio es analizar el impacto de las variables objetivo de política macroeconómica (inflación y desempleo) en la duración de los gobiernos de la Transición y la Democracia (TyD), y compararlo con la influencia del superávit/déficit de popularidad, los rasgos del ejecutivo, las características del sistema político y, los eventos, hechos y acontecimientos. De las estimaciones realizadas concluimos que la variable más determinante ha sido el estatus de mayoría. Por el contrario, la inflación y el desempleo, aun siendo factores significativos, no han sido tan relevantes. Classification-JEL : C42, H89.

Suggested Citation

  • Jose Luis Sáez Lozano, 2002. "Economía y política en la duración de los Gobiernos: El caso de España (1977-2001)," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 161(2), pages 69-98, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:hpe:journl:y:2002:v:161:i:2:p:69-96
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Frey, Bruno S & Schneider, Friedrich, 1978. "A Politico-Economic Model of the United Kingdom," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 88(350), pages 243-253, June.
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    3. Cioffi-Revilla, Claudio, 1984. "The Political Reliability of Italian Governments: An Exponential Survival Model," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 78(2), pages 318-337, June.
    4. Warwick, Paul V., 1999. "Ministerial Autonomy or Ministerial Accommodation? Contested Bases of Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 29(2), pages 369-394, February.
    5. Heckman, James J. & Singer, Burton, 1984. "Econometric duration analysis," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 63-132.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economía política; gobierno; duración; popularidad; eventos; atributos; partidos.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C42 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Survey Methods
    • H89 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Other

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