IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/hit/hitjcm/v46y2012i1p51-64.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

An Experimental Study On Adverse Selection And Moral Hazard

Author

Listed:
  • YAMAMOTO, SHINICHI
  • 山本, 信一
  • YONEYAMA, TAKAU
  • 米山, 高生
  • KWON, W. JEAN

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Yamamoto, Shinichi & 山本, 信一 & Yoneyama, Takau & 米山, 高生 & Kwon, W. Jean, 2012. "An Experimental Study On Adverse Selection And Moral Hazard," Hitotsubashi Journal of commerce and management, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 46(1), pages 51-64, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:hit:hitjcm:v:46:y:2012:i:1:p:51-64
    DOI: 10.15057/25369
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/25369/HJcom0460105100.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.15057/25369?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Manning, Willard G, et al, 1987. "Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 251-277, June.
    2. Hanming Fang & Michael P. Keane & Dan Silverman, 2008. "Sources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(2), pages 303-350, April.
    3. Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry & Amir Sufi, 2005. "Dynamic Inefficiencies in Insurance Markets: Evidence from Long-Term Care Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 224-228, May.
    4. Cutler, David M. & Zeckhauser, Richard J., 2000. "The anatomy of health insurance," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 563-643, Elsevier.
    5. Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, 2010. "Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(1), pages 39-84, March.
    6. Georges Dionne & Pascal St-Amour & Désiré Vencatachellum, 2009. "Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Mauritian Slave Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(4), pages 1269-1295.
    7. Tomas Philipson & John Cawley, 1999. "An Empirical Examination of Information Barriers to Trade in Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 827-846, September.
    8. Neudeck, Werner & Podczeck, Konrad, 1996. "Adverse selection and regulation in health insurance markets," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 387-408, August.
    9. Ettner, Susan L., 1997. "Adverse selection and the purchase of Medigap insurance by the elderly," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 543-562, October.
    10. Joe Chen & Yun Jeong Choi & Yasuyuki Sawada, 2008. "Suicide and Life Insurance," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-558, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    11. Jay Bhattacharya & Dana Goldman & Neeraj Sood, 2003. "Market Evidence of Misperceived Prices and Mistaken Mortality Risks," NBER Working Papers 9863, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. C. P. Gupta & Arushi Jain, 2022. "A Study of Banks’ Systemic Importance and Moral Hazard Behaviour: A Panel Threshold Regression Approach," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 15(11), pages 1-23, November.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, 2010. "Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(1), pages 39-84, March.
    2. Keane, Michael & Stavrunova, Olena, 2016. "Adverse selection, moral hazard and the demand for Medigap insurance," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 190(1), pages 62-78.
    3. Xiaoqi Zhang & Yi Chen & Yi Yao, 2021. "Dynamic information asymmetry in micro health insurance: implications for sustainability," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 46(3), pages 468-507, July.
    4. Annette Hofmann & Mark Browne, 2013. "One-sided commitment in dynamic insurance contracts: Evidence from private health insurance in Germany," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 81-112, February.
    5. Keane, Michael & Stavrunova, Olena, 2016. "Adverse selection, moral hazard and the demand for Medigap insurance," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 190(1), pages 62-78.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hit:hitjcm:v:46:y:2012:i:1:p:51-64. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Digital Resources Section, Hitotsubashi University Library (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cmhitjp.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.