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Exploring Stakeholders in Elderly Community Retrofit Projects: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis

Author

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  • Li Guo

    (Department of Civil Engineering, National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University, Hsinchu City 30010, Taiwan
    School of Urban Economics and Management, Beijing University of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Beijing 100044, China)

  • Ren-Jye Dzeng

    (Department of Civil Engineering, National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University, Hsinchu City 30010, Taiwan)

  • Shuya Hao

    (School of Management Science and Engineering, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 100081, China)

  • Chaojie Zhang

    (School of Urban Economics and Management, Beijing University of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Beijing 100044, China)

  • Shuang Zhang

    (School of Architecture and Built Environment, University of Newcastle, Callaghan, NSW 2308, Australia)

  • Liyaning Tang

    (School of Architecture and Built Environment, Centre for Construction Safety and Well-Being, University of Newcastle, Callaghan, NSW 2308, Australia)

Abstract

Renovating aging housing is a critical project at the grassroots of social governance and a significant aspect of public welfare. However, renovation processes often encounter difficulties due to conflicts among muti-level stakeholders, influenced by multiple factors. This paper investigates the stakeholders involved in Elderly Community Retrofit Projects (ECRPs), categorizing them into three primary groups: government organizations, renovation enterprises, and elderly families. Through the study of evolutionary game models, it was found that bounded rational actors continually adjust their optimal strategies in response to environmental changes. The government occupies a central role among stakeholders involved in ECRP. During renovation processes, governments and enterprises should provide elderly households with material or other welfare subsidies as much as possible to promote their active cooperation and participation. The integrity of enterprises is closely tied to the strength of governmental enforcement measures; hence, governments should establish a unified standard system, clarify regulatory content, and foster the orderly development of ECRPs.

Suggested Citation

  • Li Guo & Ren-Jye Dzeng & Shuya Hao & Chaojie Zhang & Shuang Zhang & Liyaning Tang, 2024. "Exploring Stakeholders in Elderly Community Retrofit Projects: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 16(18), pages 1-22, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:16:y:2024:i:18:p:8016-:d:1477577
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Xin Liang & Geoffrey Qiping Shen & Li Guo, 2015. "Improving Management of Green Retrofits from a Stakeholder Perspective: A Case Study in China," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 12(11), pages 1-20, October.
    2. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-666, May.
    3. Jingyu Yu & Guixia Ma & Shuxia Wang, 2021. "Do Age-Friendly Rural Communities Affect Quality of Life? A Comparison of Perceptions from Middle-Aged and Older Adults in China," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 18(14), pages 1-13, July.
    4. Panke Zhang & Mengtian Wang & Guoqu Deng, 2023. "Evolutionary Game Analysis of Resilient Community Construction Driven by Government Regulation and Market," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(4), pages 1-19, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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