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A New Decision Framework of Online Multi-Attribute Reverse Auctions for Green Supplier Selection under Mixed Uncertainty

Author

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  • Shilei Wang

    (Bussiness School, Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics, Zhengzhou 454000, China
    Collaborative Innovation Center of Henan Province for Aviation Economic Development, Zhengzhou 454000, China)

  • Ying Ji

    (School of Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai 200444, China)

  • M. I. M. Wahab

    (Department of Mechanical and Industrial Engineering, Toronto Metropolitan University, Toronto, ON M5B 2K3, Canada)

  • Dan Xu

    (Bussiness School, Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics, Zhengzhou 454000, China)

  • Changbao Zhou

    (Bussiness School, Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics, Zhengzhou 454000, China)

Abstract

In order to realize the “dual carbon” goal proposed for the world and to seek the low-carbon and sustainable development of the economy and society, the green supply chain management problem faced by Chinese enterprises and governments is particularly important. At the same time, how to quickly and efficiently select the suitable green supplier is the most basic and critical link in green supply chain management, as well as an important issue that Chinese government and enterprises must face in the process of green material procurement. In addition, there are various uncertainties emerging in the current market environment that hinder the green suppliers and the buyer to make the efficient decisions. Therefore, in order to find a more suitable and efficient method for green supplier selection, from the standpoint of the buyer, a new decision framework of online multi-sourcing, multi-attribute reverse auction (OMSMARA), which effectively improves the procurement efficiency and reduces procurement costs and risks, is proposed under the mixed uncertainty. Specifically, the main innovation work includes three aspects: Firstly, the trapezoidal fuzzy numbers are applied to describe the uncertain bidding attribute values by the green suppliers. Secondly, the hesitant fuzzy sets theory is introduced to characterize the buyer’s satisfaction degrees of the bidding evaluation attribute information, and the attribute weights are determined by using the hesitant fuzzy maximizing deviation method. Thirdly, a fuzzy multi-objective mixed integer programming model is proposed to solve the green supplier selection and quantity allocation question in OMSMARA. A numerical example is given to demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed decision framework, and the sensitivity analysis and comparison analysis further show the robustness and reliability of the proposed solution method.

Suggested Citation

  • Shilei Wang & Ying Ji & M. I. M. Wahab & Dan Xu & Changbao Zhou, 2022. "A New Decision Framework of Online Multi-Attribute Reverse Auctions for Green Supplier Selection under Mixed Uncertainty," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(24), pages 1-23, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:14:y:2022:i:24:p:16879-:d:1005134
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    References listed on IDEAS

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