IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/gam/jsusta/v13y2021i23p13402-d694370.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Institutional Diversity of Transferring Land Development Rights in China—Cases from Zhejiang, Hubei, and Sichuan

Author

Listed:
  • Chen Shi

    (School of Public Policy and Administration, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an 710049, China)

  • Zhou Zhang

    (School of Management Science and Engineering, Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, Guiyang 550025, China)

Abstract

With the continuous urbanization, China is facing a dilemma of achieving two conflicting targets in land governance, i.e., the continuous supply of urban construction land to support urbanization and the preservation of cultivated land for food security. Under China’s dual land system, the implementation of the “Linkage between Urban-land Taking and Rural-land Giving” (Linkage) policy is of great significance in promoting more inclusive urbanization by commodifying the land development right and connecting urban and rural land markets. In the specific land property right system and changing land governance of China, this policy appears to provide an opportunity for stakeholders other than the state to compete for the value from the transfer of development rights (TDR) and triggers the emergence of diversified approaches in organizing land projects in rural China. Based on the theoretical perspective of New Institutional Economics and empirical evidence from Zhejiang Province, Hubei Province, and Sichuan Province, this paper conducts a comparative institutional analysis for China’s TDR practice and argues that the diversified operational approaches in China’s practice have aligned various interests of the stakeholders through flexible participation methods and elaborate reallocation of land property rights, in order to fit various institutional environments and material conditions

Suggested Citation

  • Chen Shi & Zhou Zhang, 2021. "Institutional Diversity of Transferring Land Development Rights in China—Cases from Zhejiang, Hubei, and Sichuan," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(23), pages 1-16, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:13:y:2021:i:23:p:13402-:d:694370
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/23/13402/pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/23/13402/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. World Bank & the People’s Republic of China Development Research Center of the State Council, 2014. "Urban China : Toward Efficient, Inclusive, and Sustainable Urbanization," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 18865.
    2. Fubing Su & Ran Tao & Hui Wang, 2013. "State Fragmentation and Rights Contestation: Rural Land Development Rights in China," China & World Economy, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, vol. 21(4), pages 36-55, July.
    3. Kamakshi Thapa & Vibhas Sukhwani & Sameer Deshkar & Rajib Shaw & Bijon Kumer Mitra, 2020. "Strengthening Urban-Rural Resource Flow through Regional Circular and Ecological Sphere (R-CES) Approach in Nagpur, India," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(20), pages 1-18, October.
    4. Feng Deng, 2013. "Land development right and collective ownership in China," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(2), pages 190-205, June.
    5. Shahriar Kibriya & David Bessler & Edwin Price, 2019. "Linkages between poverty and income inequality of urban–rural sector: a time series analysis of India’s urban-based aspirations from 1951 to 1994," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(6), pages 446-453, March.
    6. Alison Caffyn & Margareta Dahlstrom, 2005. "Urban-rural interdependencies: Joining up policy in practice," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(3), pages 283-296.
    7. Hui Wang & Ran Tao & Juer Tong, 2009. "Trading Land Development Rights under a Planned Land Use System: The “Zhejiang Model”," China & World Economy, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, vol. 17(1), pages 66-82, January.
    8. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    9. Chen Shi & Bo-sin Tang, 2020. "Institutional change and diversity in the transfer of land development rights in China: The case of Chengdu," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 57(3), pages 473-489, February.
    10. Oliver E. Williamson, 2000. "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(3), pages 595-613, September.
    11. North, Douglass C., 1971. "Institutional Change and Economic Growth," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(1), pages 118-125, March.
    12. Berdegué, Julio A. & Carriazo, Fernando & Jara, Benjamín & Modrego, Félix & Soloaga, Isidro, 2015. "Cities, Territories, and Inclusive Growth: Unraveling Urban–Rural Linkages in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 56-71.
    13. McConnell, Virginia & Walls, Margaret & Kopits, Elizabeth, 2006. "Zoning, TDRs and the density of development," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 440-457, May.
    14. Ho, Peter, 2005. "Institutions in Transition: Land Ownership, Property Rights, and Social Conflict in China," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199280698.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Chen Shi & Bo-sin Tang, 2020. "Institutional change and diversity in the transfer of land development rights in China: The case of Chengdu," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 57(3), pages 473-489, February.
    2. Chen, Huirong, 2022. "Linking institutional function with form: Distributional dynamics, disequilibrium, and rural land shareholding in China," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
    3. Yochanan Shachmurove, 2012. "Failing Institutions Are at the Core of the U.S. Financial Crisis," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-040, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    4. Wang, Rongyu & Tan, Rong, 2020. "Patterns of revenue distribution in rural residential land consolidation in contemporary China: The perspective of property rights delineation," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    5. Yochanan Shachmurove, 2012. "Financial Crises And Econonomic Institutions An Institutional Account Of The Usa Financial Crisis," Montenegrin Journal of Economics, Economic Laboratory for Transition Research (ELIT), vol. 8(2), pages 45-52.
    6. Wen, Lanjiao & Chatalova, Lioudmila & Butsic, Van & Hu, Fox ZhiYong & Zhang, Anlu, 2020. "Capitalization of land development rights in rural China: A choice experiment on individuals’ preferences in peri-urban Shanghai," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    7. Todorova, Tamara, 2022. "Оливър Уилямсън: Новатор На 20 Век И Основател На Новата Институционална Икономика [Oliver Williamson: an innovator of the 20th century and founder of the new institutional economics]," MPRA Paper 121077, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Dai, Darong, 2013. "Cooperative economic growth," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 407-415.
    9. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2007. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 74(296), pages 573-585, November.
    10. Aseem Kaul & Jiao Luo, 2018. "An economic case for CSR: The comparative efficiency of for‐profit firms in meeting consumer demand for social goods," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(6), pages 1650-1677, June.
    11. Kim, Jongwook & Mahoney, Joseph T., 2008. "A Strategic Theory of the Firm as a Nexus of Incomplete Contracts: A Property Rights Approach," Working Papers 08-0108, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    12. Rok Spruk & Mitja Kovac, 2018. "Inefficient Growth," Review of Economics and Institutions, Università di Perugia, vol. 9(2).
    13. De Alessi, Michael & Sullivan, Joseph M. & Hilborn, Ray, 2014. "The legal, regulatory, and institutional evolution of fishing cooperatives in Alaska and the West Coast of the United States," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 217-225.
    14. Caballero-Miguez, Gonzalo & Fernández-González, Raquel, 2015. "Institutional analysis, allocation of liabilities and third-party enforcement via courts: The case of the Prestige oil spill," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 90-101.
    15. Prateek Goorha & Vijay Mohan, 2016. "Toward a theory of Smart Institutions," Journal of Economic Structures, Springer;Pan-Pacific Association of Input-Output Studies (PAPAIOS), vol. 5(1), pages 1-23, December.
    16. Kherallah, Mylène & Kirsten, Johann, 2001. "The new institutional economics," MSSD discussion papers 41, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    17. Trew, Alex, 2009. "Institutions and the Scale Effect," SIRE Discussion Papers 2009-51, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    18. Buchen, Clemens, 2010. "Emerging economic systems in Central and Eastern Europe – a qualitative and quantitative assessment," EconStor Theses, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 37141, September.
    19. Natalya Solodilova & Rustam Malikov & Konstantin Grishin, 2016. "Development of the Tools for the Assessment of the Influence of Administrative Regulation on the Business Efficiency in the Region," Economy of region, Centre for Economic Security, Institute of Economics of Ural Branch of Russian Academy of Sciences, vol. 1(4), pages 1001-1013.
    20. Williamson, Oliver E., 2010. "Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, vol. 86(3), pages 215-226.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:13:y:2021:i:23:p:13402-:d:694370. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: MDPI Indexing Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mdpi.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.