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Compensation Scheme for Self-Employed Bus Service Requisitions in Urban–Rural Passenger Transport

Author

Listed:
  • Chunqin Zhang

    (School of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Zhejiang Sci-Tech University, Hangzhou 310018, China)

  • Yuting Hu

    (School of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Zhejiang Sci-Tech University, Hangzhou 310018, China)

  • Anning Ni

    (School of Naval Architecture, Ocean & Civil Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200052, China)

  • Hongwei Li

    (College of Civil and Transportation Engineering, Hohai University, Nanjing 210098, China)

Abstract

This paper addresses a compensation scheme for self-employed bus service requisition of rural passenger transport, and provides a theoretical basis and policy recommendations for the smooth implementation of self-employed bus service requisition process and the integration of urban–rural passenger transport resources. Using Chinese urban–rural passenger transport systems in ten cities or counties (including Shenyang, Liaoyang, Wuxi, Suzhou, Laiwu, Zouping, Wuhu, Guangde, Shuangliu, and Fuyang) as research objects, the compensation scheme for self-employed bus service requisition is explored from three aspects: the construction of compensation model, the estimation of compensation amount, and the determination of compensation mode. The conclusions drawn from this study are summarized as follows: (1) The compensation amount consists of the bus service residual value, the compensation for expected profit in the residual operation period, and the awarded amount for signing compensation agreements. (2) Whether or not bus owners accept the compensation amount is closely related to their psychological expectation threshold. Changes in the average profit of the bus service, the driver’s average wage, and the ticket-seller’s wage, have the greatest impact, the second greatest impact, and the smallest impact on their psychological expectation threshold, respectively. (3) Younger and more highly educated owners tend to accept “monetary compensation and reemployment placement”, while older and low educated owners prefer “monetary compensation and social security”. (4) High compensation fees, providing reemployment placement for drivers and ticket-sellers, and implementing monetary compensation in the form of an “expected income dividend installment” can enhance willingness to sign compensation agreements for self-employed bus service.

Suggested Citation

  • Chunqin Zhang & Yuting Hu & Anning Ni & Hongwei Li, 2019. "Compensation Scheme for Self-Employed Bus Service Requisitions in Urban–Rural Passenger Transport," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(18), pages 1-20, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:11:y:2019:i:18:p:4855-:d:264473
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Peiqing Li & Longlong Jiang & Shunfeng Zhang & Xi Jiang, 2022. "Demand Response Transit Scheduling Research Based on Urban and Rural Transportation Station Optimization," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(20), pages 1-17, October.

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