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Non-Emptiness, Relative Coincidences and Axiomatic Results for the Precore

Author

Listed:
  • Yan-An Hwang

    (Department of Applied Mathematics, National Dong Hwa University, Hualien 974, Taiwan)

  • Yu-Hsien Liao

    (Department of Applied Mathematics, National Pingtung University, Pingtung 900, Taiwan)

Abstract

Taking into account the definition of the precore, we initially analyze its non-emptiness using duality results from linear programming theory. We then introduce the dominance core to investigate the coincident relations between the precore and dominance core. Finally, we propose specific reduction approaches to axiomatize the precore.

Suggested Citation

  • Yan-An Hwang & Yu-Hsien Liao, 2023. "Non-Emptiness, Relative Coincidences and Axiomatic Results for the Precore," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(13), pages 1-12, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:11:y:2023:i:13:p:2812-:d:1177158
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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