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Evolutionary Game of Vaccination Considering Both Epidemic and Economic Factors by Infectious Network of Complex Nodes

Author

Listed:
  • Bing Li

    (School of Economics, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430070, China)

  • Ziye Xiang

    (School of Economics, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430070, China)

Abstract

Vaccines are recognized as an effective way to control the spread of epidemics. It should be noted that the vaccination of a population is influenced not only by the infectiousness of a disease but also the vaccination strategy, such as the cost of vaccination. An accurate prediction model is helpful in forecasting the most likely trend to support smart decisions. In order to solve this problem, a model of epidemic spread dynamics is proposed, which is called the Susceptible–Infected–Vaccinated with vaccine A–Vaccinated with vaccine B–Recovered ( S I V A V B R ) model. This model assesses the competition between two vaccines in terms of economic cost and protection effectiveness in an open-market economy. The optimization process of individual vaccination decision-making was studied in an evolutionary game. In addition, a novel network containing environmental nodes and individual nodes was used to simulate the increase in infection probability caused by aggregation. Using the mean-field approach, the existence and stability of the disease-free equilibrium point and the endemic equilibrium point were demonstrated. Numerous simulations were further carried out to examine the relationship between the basic reproduction number and epidemic dynamics. The results reveal that immunization hesitation reduces the immunity level of the entire population. It is important to improve vaccine efficiency and affordability for manufacturers to become more competitive. Establishing the core individuals in the network is also a means of quickly occupying the market.

Suggested Citation

  • Bing Li & Ziye Xiang, 2023. "Evolutionary Game of Vaccination Considering Both Epidemic and Economic Factors by Infectious Network of Complex Nodes," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(12), pages 1-26, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:11:y:2023:i:12:p:2697-:d:1171019
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    References listed on IDEAS

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