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Role of Enterprise Alliance in Carbon Emission Reduction Mechanism: An Evolutionary Game Analysis

Author

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  • Jichao Geng

    (School of Economics and Management, Anhui University of Science and Technology, Huainan 232001, China)

  • Meiyu Ji

    (School of Economics and Management, Anhui University of Science and Technology, Huainan 232001, China)

  • Li Yang

    (School of Economics and Management, Anhui University of Science and Technology, Huainan 232001, China)

Abstract

This study constructs the enterprise alliance game party, designs the mechanism for which the alliance and the government are jointly responsible for enterprise carbon emission reduction work, and explores the evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) of the government, enterprises, and enterprise alliance under the policy of carbon tax and carbon trading with numerical simulations. The results show that: (1) the ESSs of the enterprise alliance are always to give technical support to enterprises; (2) the carbon trading price below the critical value can mobilize the enthusiasm of enterprises for honest emission reduction; (3) the carbon tax rate has a negative correlation with enterprise emission reduction behavior; (4) when the underreported carbon emissions of enterprises exceed the critical value, the enterprise will evolve into dishonest emission reduction. The high carbon emissions underreported by enterprises will mobilize the enthusiasm of the government to choose supervision. This study may be of certain reference significance to optimize the existing carbon emission reduction mechanism and achieve win-win cooperation between enterprises and government in the carbon trading market.

Suggested Citation

  • Jichao Geng & Meiyu Ji & Li Yang, 2022. "Role of Enterprise Alliance in Carbon Emission Reduction Mechanism: An Evolutionary Game Analysis," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(18), pages 1-17, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jijerp:v:19:y:2022:i:18:p:11368-:d:911224
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Wu, Xiaoping & Liu, Peng & Yang, Lin & Shi, Zhuangfei & Lao, Yongshuai, 2024. "Impact of three carbon emission reduction policies on carbon verification behavior: An analysis based on evolutionary game theory," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 295(C).
    3. Tao Li & Lei Ma & Zheng Liu & Chaonan Yi & Kaitong Liang, 2023. "Dual Carbon Goal-Based Quadrilateral Evolutionary Game: Study on the New Energy Vehicle Industry in China," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 20(4), pages 1-16, February.
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