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Self-Serving Dishonesty Partially Substitutes Fairness in Motivating Cooperation When People Are Treated Fairly

Author

Listed:
  • Dandan Li

    (MOE Key Laboratory of Cognition and Personality, Faculty of Psychology, Southwest University, Chongqing 400715, China)

  • Ofir Turel

    (Computing Information Systems, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC 3010, Australia)

  • Shuyue Zhang

    (Guangxi Colleges and Universities Key Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience and Applied Psychology, Faculty of Education, Guangxi Normal University, Guilin 541006, China)

  • Qinghua He

    (MOE Key Laboratory of Cognition and Personality, Faculty of Psychology, Southwest University, Chongqing 400715, China
    Guangxi Colleges and Universities Key Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience and Applied Psychology, Faculty of Education, Guangxi Normal University, Guilin 541006, China
    Collaborative Innovation Center of Assessment toward Basic Education Quality at Beijing Normal University, Southwest University Branch, Chongqing 400715, China)

Abstract

Fairness is a key expectation in social interactions. Its violation leads to adverse reactions, including non-cooperation and dishonesty. The present study aimed to examine how (1) fair (unfair) treatment may drive cooperation (defection) and honesty (self-serving dishonesty), (2) dishonesty primes further moral disengagement and reduced cooperation, and (3) dishonesty weakens (substitutes) the effect of fairness on cooperation. The prisoner’s dilemma (Experiment 1 and 2) and die-rolling task (Experiment 2) were employed for capturing cooperation and dishonest behaviors, respectively. To manipulate perceived unfairness, participants were randomly assigned to play the prisoner’s dilemma game, where players either choose more cooperation (fair condition) or defection (unfair condition). Results of Experiment 1 ( n = 102) suggested that participants perceive higher unfairness and behave less cooperatively when the other player primarily chooses defection. Results of Exp. 2 ( n = 240) (a) confirmed Exp. 1 results, (b) showed that players in the unfair condition also show more self-serving dishonest behavior, and (c) that dishonest behavior weakens the effect of fairness on cooperation. Together, these results extended previous work by highlighting the self-serving lies when the opponent is fair trigger higher cooperation, presumably as a means to alleviate self-reflective moral emotions or restore justice.

Suggested Citation

  • Dandan Li & Ofir Turel & Shuyue Zhang & Qinghua He, 2022. "Self-Serving Dishonesty Partially Substitutes Fairness in Motivating Cooperation When People Are Treated Fairly," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(10), pages 1-14, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jijerp:v:19:y:2022:i:10:p:6326-:d:821774
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    References listed on IDEAS

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