IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/gam/jijerp/v16y2019i23p4666-d290109.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Game-Theory Method to Design Job Rotation Schedules to Prevent Musculoskeletal Disorders Based on Workers’ Preferences and Competencies

Author

Listed:
  • Sabina Asensio-Cuesta

    (Instituto de Tecnologías de la Información y Comunicaciones (ITACA), Universitat Politècnica de València, Camino de Vera s/n, 46022 València, Spain)

  • Juan M. García-Gómez

    (Instituto de Tecnologías de la Información y Comunicaciones (ITACA), Universitat Politècnica de València, Camino de Vera s/n, 46022 València, Spain)

  • José-Luis Poza-Luján

    (Instituto Universitario de Áutomática e Informática Industrial, Universitat Politècnica de València, Camino de Vera s/n, 46022 València, Spain)

  • J. Alberto Conejero

    (Instituto Universitario de Matemática Pura y Aplicada, Universitat Politècnica de València, Camino de Vera s/n, 46022 València, Spain)

Abstract

Job rotation is an organizational strategy based on the systematic exchange of workers between jobs in a planned manner according to specific criteria. This study presents the GS-Rot method, a method based on Game Theory, in order to design job rotation schedules by considering not only workers’ job preferences, but also the competencies required for different jobs. With this approach, we promote workers’ active participation in the design of the rotation plan. It also let us deal with restrictions in assigning workers to job positions according to their disabilities (temporal or permanent). The GS-Rot method has been implemented online and applied to a case in a work environment characterized by the presence of a high repetition of movements, which is a significant risk factor associated with work-related musculoskeletal disorders (WMSDs). A total of 17 workstations and 17 workers were involved in the rotation, four of them with physical/psychological limitations. Feasible job rotation schedules were obtained in a short time (average time 27.4 milliseconds). The results indicate that in the rotations driven by preference priorities, almost all the workers (94.11%) were assigned to one of their top five preferences. Likewise, 48.52% of job positions were assigned to workers in their top five of their competence lists. When jobs were assigned according to competence, 58.82% of workers got an assignment among their top five competence lists. Furthermore, 55.87% of the workers achieved jobs in their top five preferences. In both rotation scenarios, the workers varied performed jobs, and fatigue accumulation was balanced among them. The GS-Rot method achieved feasible and uniform solutions regarding the workers’ exposure to job repetitiveness.

Suggested Citation

  • Sabina Asensio-Cuesta & Juan M. García-Gómez & José-Luis Poza-Luján & J. Alberto Conejero, 2019. "A Game-Theory Method to Design Job Rotation Schedules to Prevent Musculoskeletal Disorders Based on Workers’ Preferences and Competencies," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 16(23), pages 1-16, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jijerp:v:16:y:2019:i:23:p:4666-:d:290109
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/16/23/4666/pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/16/23/4666/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "What Have We Learned from Market Design?," Innovation Policy and the Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(1), pages 79-112.
    2. Osborne, Martin J., 2009. "Introduction to Game Theory: International Edition," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195322484, Decembrie.
    3. Kaymaz, Kurtuluş, 2010. "The Effects of Job Rotation Practices on Motivation: A Research on Managers in the Automotive Organizations," Business and Economics Research Journal, Uludag University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, vol. 1(3), pages 1-69, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Battini, Daria & Berti, Nicola & Finco, Serena & Zennaro, Ilenia & Das, Ajay, 2022. "Towards industry 5.0: A multi-objective job rotation model for an inclusive workforce," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 250(C).
    2. Ruan C. M. Teixeira & Walter P. S. Guimarães & Josiel G. Ribeiro & Rubens A. Fernandes & Lennon B. F. Nascimento & Israel G. Torné & Fábio S. Cardoso & Gabriella R. Monteiro, 2022. "Analysis of the Reduction of Ergonomic Risks through the Implementation of an Automatic Tape Packaging Machine," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(22), pages 1-18, November.
    3. Eryk Szwarc & Grzegorz Bocewicz & Paulina Golińska-Dawson & Zbigniew Banaszak, 2023. "Proactive Operations Management: Staff Allocation with Competence Maintenance Constraints," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(3), pages 1-20, January.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "The Effects of a Centralized Clearinghouse on Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices," NBER Chapters, in: Studies of Labor Market Intermediation, pages 235-271, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Salgado Alfredo, 2018. "Incomplete Information and Costly Signaling in College Admissions," Working Papers 2018-23, Banco de México.
    3. Thilo Klein, 2015. "Does Anti-Diversification Pay? A One-Sided Matching Model of Microcredit," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1521, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    4. Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "Market Culture: How Rules Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 199-219, August.
    5. Claudia M. Landeo, 2018. "Exclusionary vertical restraints and antitrust: experimental law and economics contributions," Chapters, in: Joshua C. Teitelbaum & Kathryn Zeiler (ed.), Research Handbook on Behavioral Law and Economics, chapter 3, pages 75-100, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Hans Kjellberg, 2021. "Market expertise at work: introducing Alvin E. Roth and Michel Callon," AMS Review, Springer;Academy of Marketing Science, vol. 11(3), pages 216-218, December.
    7. Godinho, Pedro & Dias, Joana, 2013. "Two-player simultaneous location game: Preferential rights and overbidding," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 229(3), pages 663-672.
    8. Zhu, Min, 2014. "College admissions in China: A mechanism design perspective," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 618-631.
    9. Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2020. "Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(2), pages 237-258, March.
    10. Alexey Kushnir & Shuo Liu, 2017. "On linear transformations of intersections," ECON - Working Papers 255, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    11. Alfredo Salgado-Torres, 2012. "A simple decentralized matching mechanism in markets with couples," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(3), pages 2044-2055.
    12. Alcalde, José, 2018. "Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (Hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 32-49.
    13. Sandra T. Silva & Isabel Mota & Filipe Grilo, 2015. "The use of game theory in regional economics: A quantitative retrospective," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 94(2), pages 421-441, June.
    14. Suvi Nenonen & Kaj Storbacka & Charlotta Windahl, 2019. "Capabilities for market-shaping: triggering and facilitating increased value creation," Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Springer, vol. 47(4), pages 617-639, July.
    15. Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter, 2011. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 3, pages 229-330, Elsevier.
    16. Hagiu, Andrei, 2009. "Why Do Intermediaries Divert Search?," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt3f34c5dk, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    17. Aditya Bhave & Eric Budish, 2017. "Primary-Market Auctions for Event Tickets: Eliminating the Rents of 'Bob the Broker'?," NBER Working Papers 23770, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Caterina Calsamiglia & Guillaume Haeringer & Flip Klijn, 2010. "Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1860-1874, September.
    19. Barbara Krug & Hans Hendrischke, 2012. "Market design in Chinese market places," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 525-546, September.
    20. Keshab Bhattarai, 2015. "Financial Deepening and Economic Growth in Advanced and Emerging Economies," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(1), pages 178-195, February.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gam:jijerp:v:16:y:2019:i:23:p:4666-:d:290109. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: MDPI Indexing Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mdpi.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.