IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/gam/jgames/v14y2023i5p64-d1247926.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Game Theoretic Foundations of the Gately Power Measure for Directed Networks

Author

Listed:
  • Robert P. Gilles

    (Department of Economics, The Queen’s University of Belfast, Riddel Hall, 185 Stranmillis Road, Belfast BT9 5EE, UK)

  • Lina Mallozzi

    (Department of Mathematics and Applications, University of Naples Federico II, Via Claudio 21, 80125 Naples, Italy)

Abstract

We introduce a new network centrality measure founded on the Gately value for cooperative games with transferable utilities. A directed network is interpreted as representing control or authority relations between players—constituting a hierarchical network. The power distribution embedded within a hierarchical network can be represented through appropriate TU-games. We investigate the properties of these TU-representations and investigate the Gately value of the TU-representation resulting in the Gately power measure. We establish when the Gately measure is a core power gauge, investigate the relationship of the Gately with the β -measure, and construct an axiomatisation of the Gately measure.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert P. Gilles & Lina Mallozzi, 2023. "Game Theoretic Foundations of the Gately Power Measure for Directed Networks," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(5), pages 1-19, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:14:y:2023:i:5:p:64-:d:1247926
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/14/5/64/pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/14/5/64/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gately, Dermot, 1974. "Sharing the Gains from Regional Cooperation: A Game Theoretic Application to Planning Investment in Electric Power," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 15(1), pages 195-208, February.
    2. Jochen Staudacher & Johannes Anwander, 2019. "Conditions for the uniqueness of the Gately point for cooperative games," Papers 1901.01485, arXiv.org.
    3. van den Brink, René & Rusinowska, Agnieszka, 2022. "The degree measure as utility function over positions in graphs and digraphs," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 299(3), pages 1033-1044.
    4. René van den Brink & Peter Borm, 2002. "Digraph Competitions and Cooperative Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 327-342, December.
    5. Robert P. Gilles & Lina Mallozzi, 2022. "Gately Values of Cooperative Games," Papers 2208.10189, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
    6. van den Brink, René & He, Simin & Huang, Jia-Ping, 2018. "Polluted river problems and games with a permission structure," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 182-205.
    7. Robert P. Gilles, 2010. "The Cooperative Game Theory of Networks and Hierarchies," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, number 978-3-642-05282-8, December.
    8. Gomez, Daniel & Gonzalez-Aranguena, Enrique & Manuel, Conrado & Owen, Guillermo & del Pozo, Monica & Tejada, Juan, 2003. "Centrality and power in social networks: a game theoretic approach," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 27-54, August.
    9. Smita Shandilya & Zdzislaw Szymanski & Shishir Kumar Shandilya & Ivan Izonin & Krishna Kant Singh, 2022. "Modeling and Comparative Analysis of Multi-Agent Cost Allocation Strategies Using Cooperative Game Theory for the Modern Electricity Market," Energies, MDPI, vol. 15(7), pages 1-14, March.
    10. Jicheng Liu & Dandan He, 2018. "Profit Allocation of Hybrid Power System Planning in Energy Internet: A Cooperative Game Study," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(2), pages 1-19, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Robert P. Gilles & Lina Mallozzi, 2022. "Gately Values of Cooperative Games," Papers 2208.10189, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
    2. Gilles, Robert P. & Mallozzi, Lina, 2022. "Generalised Gately Values of Cooperative Games," QBS Working Paper Series 2022/06, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's Business School.
    3. Robert P. Gilles & Lina Mallozzi, 2023. "Game theoretic foundations of the Gately power measure for directed networks," Papers 2308.02274, arXiv.org.
    4. Sridhar Mandyam & Usha Sridhar, 2017. "DON and Shapley Value for Allocation among Cooperating Agents in a Network: Conditions for Equivalence," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 5(2), pages 143-161, December.
    5. Hao Wu & Rene van den Brink & Arantza Estevez-Fernandez, 2022. "The locally partial permission value for games with a permission structure," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 22-037/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    6. René Van Den Brink & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2023. "Degree Centrality, von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility and Externalities in Networks," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 23012, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    7. René Brink, 2017. "Games with a permission structure - A survey on generalizations and applications," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 25(1), pages 1-33, April.
    8. René Van Den Brink & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2023. "Degree Centrality, von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility and Externalities in Networks," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 23012r, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, revised Jun 2024.
    9. René van den Brink & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2024. "Degree centrality, von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility and externalities in networks," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-04188289, HAL.
    10. Encarnacion Algaba & Rene van den Brink, 2019. "The Shapley Value and Games with Hierarchies," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 19-064/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    11. van den Brink, René & Rusinowska, Agnieszka, 2024. "Degree centrality, von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility and externalities in networks," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 319(2), pages 669-677.
    12. Dávid Csercsik & László Á. Kóczy, 2017. "Efficiency and Stability in Electrical Power Transmission Networks: a Partition Function Form Approach," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 1161-1184, December.
    13. Felix Fritz & Stefano Moretti & Jochen Staudacher, 2023. "Social Ranking Problems at the Interplay between Social Choice Theory and Coalitional Games," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(24), pages 1-22, December.
    14. Lukáš Adam & Tomáš Kroupa, 2017. "The intermediate set and limiting superdifferential for coalitional games: between the core and the Weber set," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 891-918, November.
    15. Joalland, Olivier & Pereau, Jean-Christophe & Rambonilaza, Tina, 2019. "Bargaining local compensation payments for the installation of new power transmission lines," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 75-85.
    16. González–Arangüena, E. & Manuel, C. & Owen, G. & del Pozo, M., 2017. "The within groups and the between groups Myerson values," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 257(2), pages 586-600.
    17. Yu Huang & Weiting Zhang & Kai Yang & Weizhen Hou & Yiran Huang, 2019. "An Optimal Scheduling Method for Multi-Energy Hub Systems Using Game Theory," Energies, MDPI, vol. 12(12), pages 1-20, June.
    18. C. Manuel & D. Martín, 2021. "A value for communication situations with players having different bargaining abilities," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 301(1), pages 161-182, June.
    19. Francis Bloch & Matthew O. Jackson & Pietro Tebaldi, 2023. "Centrality measures in networks," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(2), pages 413-453, August.
    20. Daphne Cornelisse & Thomas Rood & Mateusz Malinowski & Yoram Bachrach & Tal Kachman, 2022. "Neural Payoff Machines: Predicting Fair and Stable Payoff Allocations Among Team Members," Papers 2208.08798, arXiv.org.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:14:y:2023:i:5:p:64-:d:1247926. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: MDPI Indexing Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mdpi.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.