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Hybrid Assessment Scheme Based on the Stern- Judging Rule for Maintaining Cooperation under Indirect Reciprocity

Author

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  • Isamu Okada

    (Faculty of Business Administration, Soka University, Tangi 1-236, Hachioji City, Tokyo 192-8577, Japan
    Department of Information Systems and Operations, Vienna University of Economics, 1020 Wien, Austria)

  • Hitoshi Yamamoto

    (Department of Information Systems and Operations, Vienna University of Economics, 1020 Wien, Austria
    Faculty of Business Administration, Rissho University, Shinagawa City, Tokyo 141-8602, Japan)

  • Satoshi Uchida

    (Research Center for Ethi-Culture Studies, RINRI Institute, Chiyoda City, Tokyo 102-8561, Japan)

Abstract

Intensive studies on indirect reciprocity have explored rational assessment rules for maintaining cooperation and several have demonstrated the effects of the stern-judging rule. Uchida and Sasaki demonstrated that the stern-judging rule is not suitable for maintaining cooperative regimes in private assessment conditions while a public assessment system has been assumed in most studies. Although both assessment systems are oversimplified and society is most accurately represented by a mixture of these systems, little analysis has been reported on their mixture. Here, we investigated how much weight on the use of information originating from a public source is needed to maintain cooperative regimes for players adopting the stern-judging rule when players get information from both public and private sources. We did this by considering a hybrid-assessment scheme in which players use both assessment systems and by using evolutionary game theory. We calculated replicator equations using the expected payoffs of three strategies: unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection, and stern-judging rule adoption. Our analysis shows that the use of the rule helps to maintain cooperation if reputation information from a unique public notice board is used with more than a threshold probability. This hybrid-assessment scheme can be applied to other rules, including the simple-standing rule and the staying rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Isamu Okada & Hitoshi Yamamoto & Satoshi Uchida, 2020. "Hybrid Assessment Scheme Based on the Stern- Judging Rule for Maintaining Cooperation under Indirect Reciprocity," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-10, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:11:y:2020:i:1:p:13-:d:323209
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Isamu Okada, 2020. "A Review of Theoretical Studies on Indirect Reciprocity," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(3), pages 1-17, July.

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