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Reputation can enhance or suppress cooperation through positive feedback

Author

Listed:
  • John M. McNamara

    (School of Mathematics, University of Bristol)

  • Polly Doodson

    (School of Mathematics, University of Bristol)

Abstract

One possible explanation for the widespread existence of cooperation in nature is that individuals cooperate to establish reputations and so benefit in future interactions with others. We consider a class of games in which individuals contribute to a common good at a cost to themselves. Population members vary in type, that is, in the cost paid for a given level of contribution. We consider a form of indirect reciprocity in which the contribution of an individual depends on their partner’s reputation and their own type. Here we show that for such games, reputation destabilizes the selfish equilibrium through a novel and robust feedback mechanism. For those games in which the selfish optimal contribution to the common good increases as the contribution of the partner increases, the feedback mechanism enhances cooperation levels. In contrast, when the optimal contribution decreases as partner’s contribution increases, cooperation levels are reduced still further.

Suggested Citation

  • John M. McNamara & Polly Doodson, 2015. "Reputation can enhance or suppress cooperation through positive feedback," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 6(1), pages 1-7, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:nat:natcom:v:6:y:2015:i:1:d:10.1038_ncomms7134
    DOI: 10.1038/ncomms7134
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    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Chaoqian & Huang, Chaochao, 2022. "Between local and global strategy updating in public goods game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 606(C).
    2. Isamu Okada, 2020. "A Review of Theoretical Studies on Indirect Reciprocity," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(3), pages 1-17, July.
    3. Rayenda K. Brahmana & Hui‐Wei You & Evan Lau, 2022. "Does reputation matter for firm risk in developing country?," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(2), pages 2110-2123, April.
    4. John M McNamara & Alasdair I Houston & Olof Leimar, 2021. "Learning, exploitation and bias in games," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(2), pages 1-14, February.
    5. Isamu Okada & Hitoshi Yamamoto & Satoshi Uchida, 2020. "Hybrid Assessment Scheme Based on the Stern- Judging Rule for Maintaining Cooperation under Indirect Reciprocity," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-10, February.
    6. Wang, Jianwei & Xu, Wenshu & Chen, Wei & Yu, Fengyuan & He, Jialu, 2021. "Inter-group selection of strategy promotes cooperation in public goods game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 583(C).
    7. Lv, Ran & Qian, Jia-Li & Hao, Qing-Yi & Wu, Chao-Yun & Guo, Ning & Ling, Xiang, 2024. "The impact of reputation-based heterogeneous evaluation and learning on cooperation in spatial public goods game," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 181(C).

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