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Electoral Competition with Strategic Disclosure

Author

Listed:
  • Jacopo Bizzotto

    (Oslo Business School, Oslo Metropolitan University, 0166 Oslo, Norway)

  • Benjamin Solow

    (Department of Economics, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242, USA)

Abstract

Recent developments in information and communication technologies allow candidates for office to engage in sophisticated messaging strategies to influence voter choice. We consider how access to different technologies influence the choice of policy platforms by candidates. We find that when candidates can target messages to specific voter groups, platforms are more likely to be inefficient. In particular, when candidates can run targeted campaigns, they commit to projects that benefit small groups even when the social cost of these projects outweigh their benefits. Our results are robust to negative advertising.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacopo Bizzotto & Benjamin Solow, 2019. "Electoral Competition with Strategic Disclosure," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(3), pages 1-17, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:10:y:2019:i:3:p:29-:d:246284
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Gabriele Gratton & Galina Zudenkova, 2020. "Introduction to the Special Issue Political Games: Strategy, Persuasion, and Learning," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-2, February.

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