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The economics of split-ticket voting in representative democracies

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  • V. V. Chari
  • Larry E. Jones
  • Ramon Marimon

Abstract

In U.S. elections, voters often vote for candidates from different parties for president and Congress. Voters also express dissatisfaction with the performance of Congress as a whole and satisfaction with their own representative. We develop a model of split-ticket voting in which government spending is financed by uniform taxes but the benefits from this spending are concentrated. While the model generates split-ticket voting, overall spending is too high only if the president?s powers are limited. Overall spending is too high in a parliamentary system, and our model can be used as the basis of an argument for term limits.

Suggested Citation

  • V. V. Chari & Larry E. Jones & Ramon Marimon, 1997. "The economics of split-ticket voting in representative democracies," Working Papers 582, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedmwp:582
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alesina, Alberto & Rosenthal, Howard, 1989. "Partisan Cycles in Congressional Elections and the Macroeconomy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(2), pages 373-398, June.
    2. Alberto Alesina & Morris Fiorina & Howard Rosenthal, 1991. "Why Are There So Many Divided Senate Delegations?," NBER Working Papers 3663, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Keywords

    Government spending policy;

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