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Misbehavior Scenarios in Cognitive Radio Networks

Author

Listed:
  • Stamatios Arkoulis

    (Mobile Multimedia Laboratory, Athens University of Economics and Business, Athens 11362, Greece)

  • Giannis F. Marias

    (Mobile Multimedia Laboratory, Athens University of Economics and Business, Athens 11362, Greece)

  • Pantelis A. Frangoudis

    (Mobile Multimedia Laboratory, Athens University of Economics and Business, Athens 11362, Greece)

  • Jens Oberender

    (Faculty of Computer Science and Mathematics, University of Passau, Innstraße 43, 94032 Passau, Germany)

  • Alexandru Popescu

    (Department of Communications and Computer Systems, School of Computing, Blekinge Institute of Technology, 371 79 Karlskrona, Sweden)

  • Markus Fiedler

    (Department of Communications and Computer Systems, School of Computing, Blekinge Institute of Technology, 371 79 Karlskrona, Sweden)

  • Hermann de Meer

    (Faculty of Computer Science and Mathematics, University of Passau, Innstraße 43, 94032 Passau, Germany)

  • George C. Polyzos

    (Mobile Multimedia Laboratory, Athens University of Economics and Business, Athens 11362, Greece)

Abstract

Recent advances in the fields of Cognitive Radio and the proliferation of open spectrum access promise that spectrum-agile wireless communication will be widespread in the near future, and will bring significant flexibility and potential utility improvements for end users. With spectrum efficiency being a key objective, most relevant research focuses on smart coexistence mechanisms. However, wireless nodes may behave selfishly and should be considered as rational autonomous entities. Selfishness, pure malice or even faulty equipment can lead to behavior that does not conform to sharing protocols and etiquette. Thus, there is a need to secure spectrum sharing mechanisms against attacks in the various phases of the sharing process. Identifying these attacks and possible countermeasures is the focus of this work.

Suggested Citation

  • Stamatios Arkoulis & Giannis F. Marias & Pantelis A. Frangoudis & Jens Oberender & Alexandru Popescu & Markus Fiedler & Hermann de Meer & George C. Polyzos, 2010. "Misbehavior Scenarios in Cognitive Radio Networks," Future Internet, MDPI, vol. 2(3), pages 1-26, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jftint:v:2:y:2010:i:3:p:212-237:d:9117
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Peter Cramton & Yoav Shoham & Richard Steinberg (ed.), 2006. "Combinatorial Auctions," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262033429, April.
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