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Power Transmission Scheduling for Generators in a Deregulated Environment Based on a Game-Theoretic Approach

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  • Bingtuan Gao

    (School of Electrical Engineering, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China
    Jiangsu Key Laboratory of Smart Grid Technology and Equipment, Nanjing 210096, China)

  • Tingting Ma

    (School of Electrical Engineering, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China)

  • Yi Tang

    (School of Electrical Engineering, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China)

Abstract

In a deregulated environment of the power market, in order to lower their energy price and guarantee the stability of the power network, appropriate transmission lines have to be considered for electricity generators to sell their energy to the end users. This paper proposes a game-theoretic power transmission scheduling for multiple generators to lower their wheeling cost. Based on the embedded cost method, a wheeling cost model consisting of congestion cost, cost of losses and cost of transmission capacity is presented. By assuming each generator behaves in a selfish and rational way, the competition among the multiple generators is formulated as a non-cooperative game, where the players are the generators and the strategies are their daily schedules of power transmission. We will prove that there exists at least one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the formulated power transmission game. Moreover, a distributed algorithm will be provided to realize the optimization in terms of minimizing the wheeling cost. Finally, simulations were performed and discussed to verify the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed non-cooperative game approach for the generators in a deregulated environment.

Suggested Citation

  • Bingtuan Gao & Tingting Ma & Yi Tang, 2015. "Power Transmission Scheduling for Generators in a Deregulated Environment Based on a Game-Theoretic Approach," Energies, MDPI, vol. 8(12), pages 1-15, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jeners:v:8:y:2015:i:12:p:12401-13893:d:60123
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 1986. "The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(1), pages 1-26.
    2. Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 1986. "The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, II: Applications," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(1), pages 27-41.
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    Cited by:

    1. Padmini Sankaramurthy & Bharatiraja Chokkalingam & Sanjeevikumar Padmanaban & Zbigniew Leonowicz & Yusuff Adedayo, 2019. "Rescheduling of Generators with Pumped Hydro Storage Units to Relieve Congestion Incorporating Flower Pollination Optimization," Energies, MDPI, vol. 12(8), pages 1-19, April.
    2. Kai Ma & Shubing Hu & Jie Yang & Chunxia Dou & Josep M. Guerrero, 2017. "Energy Trading and Pricing in Microgrids with Uncertain Energy Supply: A Three-Stage Hierarchical Game Approach," Energies, MDPI, vol. 10(5), pages 1-16, May.

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