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Maximal or Minimal Differentiation in a Hotelling Market? A Fresh Perspective

Author

Listed:
  • Amit Pazgal

    (Rice University)

  • David Soberman

    (University of Toronto)

  • Raphael Thomadsen

    (Washington University in St. Louis)

Abstract

A perplexing problem in spatial modelling—going back to Hotelling’s linear market—is whether firms will cluster together or separate themselves. Maximal differentiation is the prevailing equilibrium when travel costs are quadratic and minimal differentiation results when price competition is limited. The reality for most markets is that the force that draws firms together (maximize demand) and the force that causes them to separate (avoid price competition) are both present. In many cases, this makes the characterization of an equilibrium difficult. The vast majority of research using the Hotelling model is based on the assumption that all potential consumers buy, yet the reality of many markets is that there are some consumers who seriously consider not buying. When allowing for the possibility that some consumers would consider not buying from either firm, we are able to identify equilibrium locations for firms that first choose locations and then prices in a Hotelling market with linear travel costs. Following the discussion above, we consider ranges of consumers’ willingness to pay for the products relative to the outside good such that the market is not necessarily covered for all location choices. The analysis demonstrates the existence of a pure-strategy location equilibrium, supported by a pure-strategy pricing equilibrium, where firms are moderately differentiated and the market is covered.

Suggested Citation

  • Amit Pazgal & David Soberman & Raphael Thomadsen, 2016. "Maximal or Minimal Differentiation in a Hotelling Market? A Fresh Perspective," Customer Needs and Solutions, Springer;Institute for Sustainable Innovation and Growth (iSIG), vol. 3(1), pages 42-47, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:custns:v:3:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s40547-015-0054-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s40547-015-0054-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Amit Pazgal & David Soberman & Raphael Thomadsen, 2022. "Consumer informedness: A key driver of differentiation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(2), pages 356-368, April.
    2. Stefano Colombo & Zemin Hou, 2021. "Location-Price Equilibria when Traditional Retailers Compete Against an Online Retailer," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 59(3), pages 483-502, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Differentiation; Positioning; Price competition; Pure-strategy equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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