COVID-19 Pandemic and Lockdown Fine Optimality
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- Roee Sarel, 2022. "Crime and punishment in times of pandemics," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 155-186, October.
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Keywords
COVID-19 pandemic; lockdown measures; fines; optimality; stringency;All these keywords.
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