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The Role of bank credit enhancements in securitization

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Abstract

This article looks at enhancements provided by banks in the securitization market. We start with a set of new facts on the evolution of enhancement volume provided by U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs). We highlight the importance of bank-provided enhancements in the securitization market by comparing their market share with that of financial guaranties sold by insurance companies, one of the main sellers of credit protection in the securitization market. Contrary to the notion that banks were being eclipsed by other institutions in the shadow banking system, we find that banks have held their own against insurance firms in the enhancement business.

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  • Benjamin H. Mandel & Donald P. Morgan & Chenyang Wei, 2012. "The Role of bank credit enhancements in securitization," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue 07, pages 35-46.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fednep:00023
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    Cited by:

    1. Adrian, Tobias & Breuer, Peter & Ashcraft, Adam & Cetorelli, Nicola, 2018. "A Review of Shadow Banking," CEPR Discussion Papers 13363, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Hodula, Martin, 2022. "Bringing the flashlight: Shadow banking in European Union countries," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(PB).
    3. Tobias Adrian & Adam B. Ashcraft, 2012. "shadow banking: a review of the literature," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics,, Palgrave Macmillan.
    4. Ameha Tefera Tessema & Jan Walters Kruger, 2017. "An Improvement on An Interest Rate Commission Agent Banking System Model (AIRCABS Model)," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 7(4), pages 685-705.
    5. Fong, Tom Pak Wing & Sze, Angela Kin Wan & Ho, Edmund Ho Cheung, 2021. "Assessing cross-border interconnectedness between shadow banking systems," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    6. Zhang, Xiong, 2020. "Convertible tranche in securitization," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    7. Stefano Filomeni, 2024. "The impact of the Paycheck Protection Program on the risk-taking behaviour of US banks," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 62(4), pages 1329-1353, May.
    8. Kuncl, Martin, 2019. "Securitization under asymmetric information over the business cycle," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 237-256.
    9. Flore, Raphael, 2015. "Causes of Shadow Banking - Two Regimes of Credit Risk Transformation and its Regulation," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113178, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    10. Tobias Adrian & Adam B. Ashcraft & Nicola Cetorelli, 2013. "Shadow bank monitoring," Staff Reports 638, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    11. Maurizio Trapanese, 2021. "The economics of non-bank financial intermediation: why do we need to fill the regulation gap?," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 625, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    12. Jyh-Horng Lin & Shi Chen & Fu-Wei Huang, 2018. "Bank Interest Margin, Multiple Shadow Banking Activities, and Capital Regulation," IJFS, MDPI, vol. 6(3), pages 1-20, July.
    13. Sarkisyan, Anna & Casu, Barbara, 2013. "Retained interests in securitisations and implications for bank solvency," Working Paper Series 1538, European Central Bank.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    securitization;

    JEL classification:

    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets

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