IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/sef/csefwp/210.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Securitization, Transparency and Liquidity

Author

Abstract

We present a model in which issuers of asset backed securities choose to release coarse information to enhance the liquidity of their primary market, at the cost of reducing secondary market liquidity or even causing it to freeze. The degree of transparency is inefficiently low if the social value of secondary market liquidity exceeds its private value. We analyze various types of public intervention — mandatory transparency standards, provision of liquidity to distressed banks or secondary market price support — and find that they have quite different welfare implications. Finally, transparency is greater if issuers restrain the issue size, or tranche it so as to sell the more information-sensitive tranche to sophisticated investors only.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, 2008. "Securitization, Transparency and Liquidity," CSEF Working Papers 210, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 31 Jul 2010.
    • Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:210
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.csef.it/WP/wp210.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Lasse Heje Pedersen, 2009. "Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(6), pages 2201-2238, June.
    2. Gary Gorton, 2008. "The panic of 2007," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 131-262.
    3. Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan V, 1993. "Security Design," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(4), pages 1349-1378, September.
    4. Skreta, Vasiliki & Veldkamp, Laura, 2009. "Ratings shopping and asset complexity: A theory of ratings inflation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(5), pages 678-695, July.
    5. Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas & Joel Shapiro, 2012. "The Credit Ratings Game," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(1), pages 85-112, February.
    6. Markus K. Brunnermeier, 2008. "Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-08," NBER Working Papers 14612, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Adam B. Ashcraft & Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham & James Vickery, 2010. "MBS ratings and the mortgage credit boom," Staff Reports 449, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    8. Peter M. DeMarzo, 2005. "The Pooling and Tranching of Securities: A Model of Informed Intermediation," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 18(1), pages 1-35.
    9. Glosten, Lawrence R. & Milgrom, Paul R., 1985. "Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 71-100, March.
    10. Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, 2008. "Liquidity, monetary policy, and financial cycles," Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 14(Jan).
    11. Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, 2008. "Liquidity and financial cycles," BIS Working Papers 256, Bank for International Settlements.
    12. Emmanuel Farhi & Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2013. "Fear of rejection? Tiered certification and transparency," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(4), pages 610-631, December.
    13. Joshua D. Coval & Jakub W. Jurek & Erik Stafford, 2009. "Economic Catastrophe Bonds," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 628-666, June.
    14. Gary Gorton, 2008. "The panic of 2007," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 131-262.
    15. Anand Mohan Goel, 2003. "Why Do Firms Smooth Earnings?," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76(1), pages 151-192, January.
    16. Benveniste, Lawrence M. & Spindt, Paul A., 1989. "How investment bankers determine the offer price and allocation of new issues," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 343-361.
    17. Gorton, Gary & Pennacchi, George, 1990. "Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity Creation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(1), pages 49-71, March.
    18. Anil K. Kashyap & Raghuram G. Rajan & Jeremy C. Stein, 2008. "Rethinking capital regulation," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 431-471.
    19. Rock, Kevin, 1986. "Why new issues are underpriced," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1-2), pages 187-212.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Gorton, Gary & Metrick, Andrew, 2012. "Securitized banking and the run on repo," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(3), pages 425-451.
    2. Efraim Benmelech & Jennifer Dlugosz, 2010. "The Credit Rating Crisis," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2009, Volume 24, pages 161-207, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Hanson, Samuel G. & Sunderam, Adi, 2013. "Are there too many safe securities? Securitization and the incentives for information production," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 565-584.
    4. Franke, Günter & Krahnen, Jan Pieter, 2008. "The future of securitization," CFS Working Paper Series 2008/31, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    5. Mählmann, Thomas, 2012. "Did investors outsource their risk analysis to rating agencies? Evidence from ABS-CDOs," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(5), pages 1478-1491.
    6. Zhiguo He & Wei Xiong, 2012. "Rollover Risk and Credit Risk," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(2), pages 391-430, April.
    7. Richard Stanton & Nancy Wallace, 2018. "CMBS Subordination, Ratings Inflation, and Regulatory†Capital Arbitrage," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 47(1), pages 175-201, March.
    8. Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson, 2012. "Implications of the Dodd-Frank Act," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 4(1), pages 1-38, October.
    9. Sean Flynn & Andra Ghent, 2018. "Competition and Credit Ratings After the Fall," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(4), pages 1672-1692, April.
    10. Thomas Mählmann, 2016. "Market share and risk taking: the role of collateral asset managers in the collapse of the arbitrage CDO market," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 273-303, August.
    11. Efing, Matthias, 2015. "Arbitraging the Basel securitization framework: Evidence from German ABS investment," Discussion Papers 40/2015, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    12. Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, 2010. "Credit ratings failures and policy options [Cash-in-the-market pricing and optimal resolution of bank failures]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 25(62), pages 401-431.
    13. Ricardo J Caballero, 2010. "Sudden Financial Arrest," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 58(1), pages 6-36, August.
    14. Arvind Krishnamurthy, 2010. "How Debt Markets Have Malfunctioned in the Crisis," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 24(1), pages 3-28, Winter.
    15. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6311 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Arvind Krishnamurthy, 2010. "Amplification Mechanisms in Liquidity Crises," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 1-30, July.
    17. Bernhard Pellens & Stefan Jannett & André Schmidt, 2009. "Bilanzierungsstandards im Kontext der Finanzmarktkrise," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 10(4), pages 413-435, November.
    18. Giampaolo Gabbi & Alesia Kalbaska & Alessandro Vercelli, 2014. "Factors generating and transmitting the financial crisis: The role of incentives: securitization and contagion," Working papers wpaper56, Financialisation, Economy, Society & Sustainable Development (FESSUD) Project.
    19. Chemla, Gilles & Hennessy, Christopher, 2011. "Security Design: Signaling versus Speculative Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 8336, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Opp, Christian C. & Opp, Marcus M. & Harris, Milton, 2013. "Rating agencies in the face of regulation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 46-61.
    21. Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas & Joel Shapiro, 2012. "The Credit Ratings Game," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(1), pages 85-112, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    securitization; transparency; liquidity; rating; subprime; crisis; default;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:210. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Dr. Maria Carannante (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cssalit.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.