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Discretion, rules and volatility - commentary

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  • Russell W. Cooper

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  • Russell W. Cooper, 1996. "Discretion, rules and volatility - commentary," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 78(May), pages 80-82.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedlrv:y:1996:i:may:p:80-82:n:v.78no.3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jacques Cremer, 1986. "Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(1), pages 33-49.
    2. Kotlikoff, Laurence J & Persson, Torsten & Svensson, Lars E O, 1988. "Social Contracts as Assets: A Possible Solution to the Time-Consistency Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 662-677, September.
    3. Michihiro Kandori, 1992. "Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(1), pages 81-92.
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