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Resolving sovereign debt crises with collective action clauses

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  • Kenneth M. Kletzer

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  • Kenneth M. Kletzer, 2004. "Resolving sovereign debt crises with collective action clauses," FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue feb.20.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedfel:y:2004:i:feb.20:n:2004-06
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    File URL: http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2004/el2004-06.html
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Eichengreen, Barry & Kletzer, Kenneth & Mody, Ashoka, 2003. "Crisis Resolution: Next Steps," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt4cj974r4, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
    2. Eichengreen, Barry & Mody, Ashoka, 1999. "Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2343, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Kenneth Kletzer & Mr. Barry J. Eichengreen & Mr. Ashoka Mody, 2003. "Crisis Resolution: Next Steps," IMF Working Papers 2003/196, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Becker, Torbjorn & Richards, Anthony & Thaicharoen, Yunyong, 2003. "Bond restructuring and moral hazard: are collective action clauses costly?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 127-161, October.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ghosal, Sayantan & Thampanishvong, Kannika, 2013. "Does strengthening Collective Action Clauses (CACs) help?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 68-78.
    2. Philipp Maier, 2007. "Do We Need the IMF to Resolve a Crisis? Lessons from Past Episodes of Debt Restructuring," Staff Working Papers 07-10, Bank of Canada.

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