Do We Need the IMF to Resolve a Crisis? Lessons from Past Episodes of Debt Restructuring
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Keywords
Financial stability; International topics;JEL classification:
- N1 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations
- N2 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions
- E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
- F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
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