IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/fgv/epgrbe/v71y2017i4a27016.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Jogos Vetoriais no Posicionamento Contábil de Empresas de Siderurgia e Metalurgia Listadas no BM&FBOVESPA

Author

Listed:
  • Kroenke, Adriana
  • Wilhelm, Volmir Eugênio

Abstract

O objetivo deste trabalho é definir o posicionamento contábil de empresas de siderurgia e metalurgia por meio de jogos vetoriais. São usados quatro lotes de indicadores econômico-financeiros: liquidez, endividamento, rentabilidade e atividade. A leitura é feita usando as empresas como estratégias do jogador I e os indicadores econômico-financeiros como sendo estratégias do jogador II. Trata-se de um estudo descritivo com abordagem quantitativa. Os dados foram coletados a partir das demonstrações contábeis diretamente do ECONOMÁTICA© e o ranking foi definido por meio dos métodos sugeridos por Fernández, Monroy e Puerto (1998). Como resultado obteve-se sucesso na utilização de jogos vetoriais.

Suggested Citation

  • Kroenke, Adriana & Wilhelm, Volmir Eugênio, 2017. "Jogos Vetoriais no Posicionamento Contábil de Empresas de Siderurgia e Metalurgia Listadas no BM&FBOVESPA," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 71(4), December.
    • Handle: RePEc:fgv:epgrbe:v:71:y:2017:i:4:a:27016
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://periodicos.fgv.br/rbe/article/view/27016
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. F.R. Fernández & J. Puerto & L. Monroy, 1998. "Two-person non-zero-sum gamesas multicriteria goal games," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 84(0), pages 195-208, December.
    2. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, April.
    3. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, April.
    4. F. R. Fernández & L. Monroy & J. Puerto, 1998. "Multicriteria Goal Games," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 99(2), pages 403-421, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Fabrizio Germano, 2006. "On some geometry and equivalence classes of normal form games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(4), pages 561-581, November.
    2. Eguia, Jon X. & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Morton, Rebecca & Nicolò, Antonio, 2018. "Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 465-483.
    3. Leliefeld, D. & Motchenkova, E., 2007. "To Protect in Order to Serve : Adverse Effects of Leniency Programs in View of Industry Asymmetry," Other publications TiSEM cdc81d9b-34c3-4e1c-85b8-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Matthias Blonski & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2015. "Prisoners’ other Dilemma," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(1), pages 61-81, February.
    5. Lorenzo Sacconi, 2011. "A Rawlsian View of CSR and the Game Theory of its Implementation (Part II): Fairness and Equilibrium," International Economic Association Series, in: Lorenzo Sacconi & Margaret Blair & R. Edward Freeman & Alessandro Vercelli (ed.), Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance, chapter 8, pages 194-252, Palgrave Macmillan.
    6. Carlsson, Hans & Ganslandt, Mattias, 1998. "Noisy equilibrium selection in coordination games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 23-34, July.
    7. Moretto, Michele, 2008. "Competition and irreversible investments under uncertainty," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 75-88, March.
    8. Alesina, Alberto & Spolaore, Enrico, 2005. "War, peace, and the size of countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(7), pages 1333-1354, July.
    9. Dieter Balkenborg & Josef Hofbauer & Christoph Kuzmics, 2015. "The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(1), pages 165-193, February.
    10. Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 1997. "Shaping long-run expectations in problems of coordination," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 783-806, December.
    11. Sally, David, 2001. "On sympathy and games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 1-30, January.
    12. Straub, Paul G., 1995. "Risk dominance and coordination failures in static games," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 339-363.
    13. Harsanyi, John C., 1995. "A new theory of equilibrium selection for games with complete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 91-122.
    14. Larry Samuelson, 2016. "Game Theory in Economics and Beyond," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 30(4), pages 107-130, Fall.
    15. Kets, W., 2008. "Networks and learning in game theory," Other publications TiSEM 7713fce1-3131-498c-8c6f-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    16. Souza, Filipe & Rêgo, Leandro, 2012. "Mixed Equilibrium: When Burning Money is Rational," MPRA Paper 43410, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. F. R. Fernández & M. A. Hinojosa & J. Puerto, 2002. "Core Solutions in Vector-Valued Games," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 112(2), pages 331-360, February.
    18. Houba, Harold & Wen, Quan, 2014. "Backward induction and unacceptable offers," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 151-156.
    19. Keyzer, Michiel & van Wesenbeeck, Lia, 2005. "Equilibrium selection in games: the mollifier method," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 285-301, April.
    20. Amir, Rabah & Stepanova, Anna, 2006. "Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 1-20, April.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fgv:epgrbe:v:71:y:2017:i:4:a:27016. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Núcleo de Computação da FGV EPGE (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/epgvfbr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.